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 Abstract 
 
The success of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh reinforces microcredit’s role in 
alleviating poverty and empowering the poor. In the wake of this success the 
Grameencredit has been widely duplicated in different countries around the world. 
China joined the trend to implement Grameencredit as early as 1993 but did not see 
the expected triumph. This thesis therefore explores the obstacles hindering the 
viability of Grameencredit Institutions in the Chinese context by looking into two 
Grameencredit Institutions serving the rural poor households in Northern China. A 
systematic perspective was adopted to examine these obstacles by first making 
assessment on Grameencredit Institutions’ performance, followed by organizational 
analyses while simultaneously taking account of the effect of external environment. 
On the basis of the evidence from quantitative and qualitative data, three internal 
obstacles and two external obstacles are identified. They are interrelated and can not 
be removed without enabling a microcredit-friendly environment. 
 
Keywords: Microcredit Institution, Grameencredit Institution, Open System, 
Outreach Framework, Organization Analysis, Outcome, China 
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 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Microcredit, or microfinance in regard to empowerment of the poor is defined as 
“programs extending small loans, and other financial services such as savings, to very 
poor people for self-employment projects that generate income, allowing them to care 
for themselves and their families” (Microcredit Summit Campaign [MSC] 2002). It 
has become “one of the favored interventions for poverty alleviation and economic 
development for poor households across both the developing and developed world” 
(Noponen 2003:121). Latest data from MSC (2009:3) proclaimed that as of December 
31, 2007, 154 million clients were reached by 3,552 microcredit institutions, of whom 
106.6 million were among the poorest when they took their first loan.  
 
While acknowledging this proliferation, microcredit is still quite a new emergence in 
poverty reduction: “the word ‘microcredit’ did not exist before the seventies” 
(Grameen Bank, 2009). It was not until 2005 that microcredit truly started to catch 
attention – the year was identified as “The International Year of Microcredit” by 
United Nations (UN 2005), followed by Dr. Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank’s 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for “their effort through microcredit to create economic 
and social development from below” (Nobel Peace Prize Committee 2006). 
Correspondingly, the Grameencredit (GC), originated from the Grameen Bank (GB) 
founded by Dr. Yunus, became a model to be promoted by development practitioners 
in many developing countries which wished to pursue Grameen style success for both 
poverty alleviation and financial sufficiency. So far the Grameen Bank Replication 
Program has supported 138 replication partners in 37 countries around the world to 
multiply the programs locally, including several of them in China (Grameen Trust 
2007). 
 
Unfortunately it seems the GCIs are struggling to survive in China despite having 
been introduced into the country 15 years ago. At present there are around 300 
microcredit programs in China, which can be divided into three categories in light of 
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 the running institutions: the first are programs run directly by the international 
development agencies, e.g. UNDP and UNICEF in corporation with local government 
(Zhao, 2008). In this category, only one third of them were still in operation up to date 
due to the UN’s time bind for programs (Du et al 2008:24); the second are programs 
run by the half-state-run China Poverty Alleviation Foundation with funds from 
international agencies, mainly the World Bank; the third are those run by independent 
institutes and local NGOs (Zhao, 2008). The 300 programs were mostly based on 
Grameen model though small modifications were made in some of them in an effort 
to fit the local context (Du et al 2008:20). Of the existing 300 microcredit programs, 
only 100 struggled to survive and less than 20 sustained normal operation (Cheng and 
Xu 2006). This is a very low ratio in comparison with the large proliferation of 
microcredit in many other developing countries. Against this scenario the author aims 
to launch a baseline study exploring the status quo of the third category GCIs and 
probing the possible bottlenecks hindering the buildup of GCIs in China, with an 
ultimate purpose to bridge the gap for GCIs’ maturation within Chinese settings. To 
reach the goal two questions need to be addressed:  
1. To what extent are the GCIs in China able to approach the twofold mandate of 
reaching the poor and maintaining financial self-sufficiency? 
2. What are the main obstacles hindering the viability of CGIs?  
 
The research will focus on the third category GCIs run by NGO or independent 
institutes because the first category run by international agencies is time bind bound 
to quit and will not serve as long-term programs while the second category is subject 
to the top-down dominance of government rather than self-motivation. The third 
category does deserve attention: in spite of its potential for growth, little research has 
been carried out in relation to it. 
 
The paper is composed of six chapters. The first chapter raises two research questions 
after presenting a concise background profile of microcredit. The second chapter 
reviews the poverty alleviation situation in China and how GCIs were ushered in for 
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 intervention. After that, a section is given to brief the main research trends of the 
implementation of GCIs and clarify the focus in this paper. The third chapter first 
demarcates the concept of the object of research, followed by the introduction of open 
system model and the double bottom line outreach framework which construct the 
theoretical and analytical skeleton of the study. The fourth chapter elaborates the 
methodological design and the three methods applied, a short discussion on validity, 
generalization and limitation as well as ethical consideration ensues. The fifth chapter 
provides two units of specific analyses in responding to the two research questions. 
The paper ends up with a conclusion summarizing the findings and taking a glance at 
GCIs’ potential. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
2.1 Poverty Alleviation and Microcredit in China 
 
China’s achievement towards poverty reduction has been commented as “remarkable” 
by the former World Bank president Paul Wolfowitz in 20061. In a way, it deserved 
the praise given the success to liberate over 600 million people from income poverty 
in less than 25 years between 1981 and 2005 (Chen and Ravallion 2008:11). On the 
other hand, a substantially higher poverty rate was found in China, implying about 
130 million more in consumption poverty and 65 million more in income poverty than 
past estimates by applying the international poverty line of $1.25 a day at 2005 PPP2 
(ibid:1). Even according to China’s official poverty line, which is lower than $1 a 
day3, there are still over 40 million people living in absolute or low-income poverty 
today. This implies continued challenges for China’s effort to eradicate poverty 
(Chinese State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and 
                                                        
1 Wolfowitz made this comments in his formal visit to China in October, 2005. Cited by Liu Jian, the director of
OPAD in his address on the Opening Ceremony of International Conference, Pove
 
rty Reduction Strategy in the 
e taking account the PPP for 2005 based on the international standard of $1 a day. (Chen 
and $0.2-$0.4 (￥683-￥944) a day for absolute poor and low-income groups 
New Millennium: Emerging Issues, Experiences and Lessons on May 23, 2006  
2 This is an adjusted lin
and Ravallion 2008:9 ) 
3 The line is about $0.2 (￥683) 
respectively. (OPAD, 2008) 
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 Development4 2008). 
OPAD 2008). 
he key strategy was to promote profit-oriented incentive (WB 2005).  
6:95). The above defectiveness overtly 
irrored the deadlock of subsidized loans.  
 
Essentially, there were two different, yet parallel efforts to alleviate poverty: the 
formal governmental programs as well as activities initiated by non-governmental 
institutions. Starting from 1986 the state council has rationalized the anti-poverty 
initiative by focusing on raising the income generating capacity of poor rural 
households. This was done through investments in infrastructure5, primary education 
and health care system as well as subsidized loans to farms (WB 2005; 
T
 
While the investment did get payback, a three-fold body of evidence implied that the 
subsidized loans – distributed mainly through Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC) and 
Agriculture Bank – were less effective in covering and targeting the poor: first, a huge 
backflow of financial capital from rural to urban area since only one fourth of the 
US$530 billion deposit from countryside returns to countryside (Ling 2006:95); 
second, a debt rate as high as 75% since large proportion of loans are intercepted by 
rich households; and third, a repayment rate as low as 50% on average (ibid 2006:95; 
Park and Ren 2001:4). Moreover, the commercial banks were reluctant to allocate 
discounted loans mandated by the central government because “it’s too costly and too 
much trouble to be recovered” (Ling 200
m
 
Against such a backdrop, the first microfinance program was introduced and 
implemented in China in 1994 by the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) in 
cooperation with the Yixian County government in Heibei province (Du et al 2008:7). 
It has fully used the Grameen experience as reference during its operation. In the 
following year similar programs were introduced to 48 counties in 17 provinces 
through cooperation between China International Centre for Economic and Technical 
                                                        
4 It is abbreviated as “OPAD” in following text for reading convenience 
5 e.g. roads access, electricity and drinking water 
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 Exchange and UNDP (Cheng and Xu 2006). The RCC also started to develop 
microcredit projects from the late 1990s onwards. They were acknowledged to 
ontribute to solving difficulties of the “less-poor or middle-income groups”; however, 
 microcredit 
stitutions are worthy of particular concern, given its dynamic and complementary 
ch to the poor.  
                                                       
c
they failed to reach the poorer, as labeled by the government (Du et al 2008:15).  
 
Studies regarding the implementation of CGIs turned out particularly significant due 
to the deterioration of financial situation in rural areas. In recent years the rural poor’s 
opportunities for loan were further decreased due to the withering of RCC outlets and 
the quitting of four state-owned commercial banks6 from rural markets under the 
intensified competitiveness for profit (ADB 2007:1). News from the official Xinhua 
News Agency even criticized the state-run rural financial institutions for “only 
absorbing deposit but without giving loans”, which caused “the rural financial pool to 
dry out in the long run” (Xinhuanet.com 2009). In contrast to loan shortage, 69% of 
rural residents have taken loans – this further reflects the substantial gap between loan 
demand and supply (ibid). Under such circumstances, the viability of
in
function to the rural financial markets and prominent rea
 
2.2 Research Trends of the Implementation of GCIs 
 
While there is a multitude of studies focusing on decoding the success of GC, less 
researchers interrogate the cases’ implementation in a specific context (e.g. in a region 
or a country). Therefore, research in this field is essential and meaningful, especially 
keeping in mind Hulme’s (1990, cited in Schreiner 2003:32) warning that “Grameen 
is not a blueprint but rather a source of broad lessons which must be adapted to local 
contexts.” Three approaches can be discerned from the studies conducted over the GC 
implementation. The first approach examines the feasibility of GC’s core lending 
mechanism in relation to a specific context. A good example was an experimental 
 
6 The four state-owned banks are Bank of China, China Industrial and Commercial Bank, Construction Bank and 
Agriculture Bank. 
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 study carried out with the Green Bank of Caraga in the Philippines (Park 2007:284). It 
tried to identify whether the typical GB joint-liability group lending model is more 
suitable to the Philippine circumstances than an individual lending model through 
transforming 69 (out of 161) joint-liability group lending centers into individual 
lending centers. Upon comparison the result indicated the transformation did not 
worsen repayment rate while joint-liability groups did not necessarily mitigate default 
risk, implying the possibility to tailor GC to the local context. The second approach 
has more interest in exploring the functional efficiency of GCIs at the organizational 
level. For instance, in his study regarding Prizma, an MCI in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kline (2003:39-41) has associated the social performance of GCIs with good 
management of leadership, organizational culture and incentives for personnel. The 
third approach concentrates on the optimization of micro-environment in regard to the 
viability of MCIs, e.g. the authority commitment and legitimacy of institutional and 
regulatory rules. In recent years the impact of pro-microcredit environment has been 
further realized and tested by some countries’ experience (e.g. Pakistan, Brazil and 
Colombia). This resulted in the expansion of the MCIs after governmental efforts for 
pportive legal and regulatory environment (CGAP 2007). Understandably, these su
three approaches are not exclusive of each other. 
 
According to Latifee (2003:38), the managing director of Grameen Trust, China is “a 
country with particular challenge in implementing GC” due to its environmental 
complexity and diversity. Of the three key approaches mentioned above, the first one 
– namely the lending mechanism in relation to a specific context – is currently the 
most accepted, since it has been refined after many years of practice. The controversy 
has concentrated on whether GC’s difficulties in China are due to the mismanagement 
of institutions, or due to factors beyond the control of institutions, undermining the 
GCIs’ performance (Chen and Li 2007:40; Xu 2009). Yet neither argument alone can 
straighten out the issue. To explain the growth of MCIs, Counts et al. (2006) proposed 
to integrate factors springing from both the organizational and the environmental 
viewpoints. Drawing heavily from these authors, this study attempts to identify the 
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 obstacles impeding the viability of GC from a systematic perspective. More 
specifically, this is done by using an open system model (see section 3.21), which 
rticulates the GCIs’ outcome, functional mechanism of the organizations and the 
nal environment for analysis.    
. THEORY  
3.1 Terminological Clarification  
s 
009), there are mainly two features – mandate and goal on one hand, and 
 soon as possible so as to expand its outreach 
ithout fund constraints. GC also emphasizes the building of social capital and 
. All loans are to 
e paid back in installments (weekly or bi-weekly). The loans come with both 
                                                       
a
influence of exter
 
3
 
 
Since Grameencredit is the object of research of this paper, a clear specification shall 
be provided to demarcate it from other categories of microcredit. According to Yunu
(2
technology on the other – displayed by GC which can be summarized as follows7.  
 
With reference to mandate and goal, GC promotes credit as a human right by offering 
the poor, particularly poor women, loans for self-employment and income-generating 
activities. Reaching the poor is its non-negotiable mission. Reaching sustainability is 
a directional goal that shall be realized as
w
human capital among borrowers (ibid).  
 
Technologically GC is not based on any collateral, or legally enforceable contracts, 
but on “trust”. It provides service at the doorstep of the poor based on the principle 
that the poor should not go to the bank but the bank should go to the poor. In order to 
obtain loans a borrower must join a group of borrowers. Loans can be received in a 
continuous sequence. New loan is available if previous loan is repaid
b
obligatory and voluntary savings programs for the borrowers (ibid). 
 
The first feature represents the directing motto and fundamental principles 
 
7 For complete GC feature description please see appendix 1 
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 underpinning the specific activities of the institutions, whereas the second feature is 
comprised of methods created by Grameen for the realization of the twofold mission. 
It should be noted the technical methods were not invariable as GB never stopped 
innovation. GB even marked “flexibility” as its new symbol (Dowla and Barua 
2007:XIV). The directing motto was comparatively permanent and has been widely 
ppreciated and accepted by majorities of MCIs as code of conduct whether they 
laim themselves to be Grameen type or not.  
.2 Open System Theory and Development  
3.21 Open System Theory  
endent upon the environment in which they exist for 
atz etta 2005:8). Figure 1 below presents the 
model of open system theory: 
Figure 1  Open System Theory Model 
 
a
c
 
3
 
 
Open system theory was originated from Bertalanffy’s input-output open systems 
which at the beginning “attempted to describe the biological world” (Barton et al 
2004:29; Barton and Haslett 2007:148; Drack and Apfalter 2007: 541), followed by 
Katz and Kahn (1966:18; Falletta 2005:3) to develop them for social system and 
organization analysis. The open system theory broke through the traditional closed 
system constructs which tended to treat social structures as closed machinery 
independent from environment (ibid). According to open system theory, an 
organization can be viewed as a total system with inputs, throughputs, and outputs, 
connected by feedback loops. The premise of the theory is that organizations are 
social systems which are dep
inputs (K  & Kahn 1978 cited in Fall
Transformation 
(i.e. Throughput) 
Output Input 
Environment 
Source: Falletta (2005) “Organizational Diagnostic Models: A Review & Synthesis”, p9 
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To understand the model clearly it is necessary to specify each component. 
 
 “Input” refers to some form of energy that the open system imported. It emphasizes 
that social organizations need to draw renewed supplies of energy from other 
institutions, or people, or the material environment. No social structure is 
self-sufficient or self-contained; “Throughput” refers to the progress that open 
system transforms the energy available to it. During this progress the organization 
creates a new product, or processes materials, or trains people, or provides a service. 
These activities entail some reorganization of input; “Output” means the product 
exported by the open system to the environment; “Feedback loop” refers to the 
cyclic character of the system in which the energy exchange activities repeated 
themselves (ibid:27); a positive “output” can be transferred into “input” again through 
the “feedback loop” to energize the organization in the system . “Environment” is 
where the organizations draw input from and export output to (Katz and Kahn 1966). 
The open system theory maintained that environmental inf
8
luences are integrally 
lated to the functioning of a social system, which can not be understood without a 
corporated the external environment as a factor in organizational functioning though 
                                                       
re
constant study of the forces impinged on it (ibid:27).  
 
In the past three decades many organizational diagnostic models were developed 
relying upon the open systems theory as a basic assumption. Typical ones include 
Weisbord’s Six-Box Model in1976, Congruence Model for Organization Analysis in 
1977, McKinsey 7S Framework in 1981 and 1982, High-Performance Programming 
in 1984 and the Burke-Litwin Model of Organizational Performance & Change 
(Falletta 2005). All above models have followed the input-output framework and 
in
they did differ in factors considered vital to organization functioning or effectiveness.  
 
 
8 For example, a computer manufacture made a great sale of their products, namely the output. The revenue 
earned via sales of the output can be used to buy new productive input again for repeated production, which is the 
“throughput”. 
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 GCI is an organization and therefore is subject to the applicability of open systems 
theory. It turns out even more valid when this research is related to organization’s 
accommodation and interaction with particular context. Based on the model, the 
research questions can be interpreted and conceptualized as 1) To what extent are 
GCIs able to produce output as expected in the Chinese context, namely to realize the 
twofold mission? 2) What are the main obstacles? Do they spring from the 
“throughput” progress, namely is the organization inherently inefficient in some 
respects; or is it subject largely to the “input” deficiency in relation to the influence of 
xternal environment (e.g. financial investment, human resource intake, national 
lore the open systems theory’s application in the development arena 
o as to identify an adequate model to inform the study of GCIs from development 
es, assets, resources, strategies and skills, both tangible and intangible. It 
e
policy and regulatory rules) ?   
 
It was noted that GCIs were engaged with development business which had its own 
assessment standards in terms of outcome and organizations’ functional efficiency. It 
is essential to exp
s
perspective.    
 
3.22 The Application of Open System Theory in Development Arena 
 
In the development arena, models based on open systems theory have been applied to 
analyze the interrelations of capacity development amidst individual, organization and 
external institutional and cultural environment. Capacity development was recognized 
as the core of human development since the mean and end of development is to 
eradicate the deprivation of capacity of each human being (Sen 1999). Through 
substantial definitions, capacity has been extensively identified as the ability for 
individual, organization and society to solve problems and manage affairs (UNDP 
2007:5; OECD-DAC 2006:7; Kaplan 2007). Inherently capacity is a systems 
phenomenon (Baser and Morgan 2008:29). In the language of systems thinking, it is 
an emergent property or the effect of multiple interactions out of a complex interplay 
of attitud
15/80 
 emerged from the positioning of an organization or system within a particular context 
amines the functioning of organization outcome, 
unning mechanism, input and external environment. It will be employed as the 
l fr
 
Figure 2  Open System Model for Development Analysis  
(ibid).  
 
In light of the open system thinking, focus and approaches to capacity development 
experienced expansion over the last three decades. In the 1970s the major focus was 
on the development of the smallest system, namely the individual, through 
scholarships, external and “on-the-job” training for people in key positions of 
development careers. In 1980s the focus was enlarged to organizations which led to 
restructuring and re-design, using organizational audits, advisory support, and help 
with the development of financial and HR systems. The 1990s brought an increased 
understanding of the wider institutional framework and the need to focus on outcomes 
(ibid:v). In 2000s the development actors’ concern was further escalated which led to 
the consensus on Paris Declaration to guide and regulate donors and recipient 
partners’ actions for improved aid effectiveness in international level (Manning 
2005:50). Whatever the “capacity system” is enlarged, the open system theory turns 
out conducive and model rooted on it has been utilized to explore the links between 
outcome, development agencies and organizations and wider institutional 
environment. Figure 2 below is the open system model used by DFID for analysis of 
development organizations, which ex
r
theoretica amework for this paper. 
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“Promoting Organizational and Institutional Development”, p2. 
Source: Cummings and Worley (2001) “Organization Development and Change” cited in DFID (2003) 
Sida in its octagon9 model (2002:4); it is related more with the control mechanism 
 
Figure 2 specifies the organizational, or the “throughput” constructs into modules of 
“people, system, structure, strategy and culture”. Nonetheless, it fundamentally 
overlaps with the original open system model presented in Figure 1. The “outcome” is 
particularly highlighted in this model because “development outcomes will shape the 
direction and the type of change needed - usually a combination of institutional and 
organizational change” (DFID 2003:2). For the same rationale in application the 
analysis will start from the right with outcomes and lead on to the action implementer, 
and then the input and institutional changes needed.  
 
The five components of “throughput” represented different aspects upholding an 
organization and inefficiency in any one of them will bring negative effect to the 
overall running of the organization. Strategy concerns the goal and mission of the 
organization and the progress planning for it (ibid:10). It regards questions such as 
what is the mandate of organization and how decisions are made in organization. 
System has a broad meaning in different organization models, for instance it was 
referred as the “financial resource and administrative routine to run its activities” by 
                                                        
9 An NGO organization analysis model comprises eight assessment modules, namely target group, activities, 
relevance, identity, structure, system and finance, expertise and working environment.  
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 and technology deployment in the pentagon10 model (Bridger and Vansina 2008). To 
incorporate these dimensions system in this study encompasses financial resource 
control and technology deployment as well as the lending mechanism which is the 
key component of GCIs. Structure refers to organization’s management level and its 
division of duties and responsibilities (Sida 2002:4). Questions relevant entail how 
does the units distribute? Is there a clear organization chart? What is the degree of 
decentralization, etc (DFID:10). HRM refers to the human resource management 
stem entailing the recruitment, meriting system as well as trainings and other 
 in the 
throughput” position. The “environment” is the Chinese context in which the GCIs 
bject influence to. Following the 
utcome assessment framework and criteria will be discussed in following section 3.3 
 
sy
incentives to manage and invigorate employees (ibid). Culture in here refers to the 
attributes of national customs and values which may affect the organization activity 
and its outcome (ibid). Thus although it was included into the “throughput”, it as such 
is a module belonging to external environment. In regards to GCIs, it is referred as the 
rural residents’ point of view and customs on loan behaviors. The five components 
make up a stable framework supporting organization running and will be articulated 
as a unit for “throughput” analysis.  
 
In this paper the GCIs is the researched organization and therefore will be laid
“
embeds, draw input from, export output to and su
energy flow and the rationale of the model, the analysis will start with evaluation of 
GCIs’ outcome so as to answer the first question—to what extent are GCIs able to 
maintain its twofold goals? The next step will go to the “throughput” component to 
analyze GCIs from organizational level with attempts to identify the bottlenecks. The 
o
in considering MCI’s outcome particularity characteristic of twofold mission.  
3.3 Double Bottom Line —Outreach Framework  
 
The difficulty of measuring the outcome of MCIs essentially lies in the MCIs’ 
                                                        
10 An organizational analysis model comprises five assessment modules, namely purpose, structure, technology, 
control system and people. 
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 mission dilemma of reaching the poor and simultaneously maintaining financial 
self-sufficiency. The two missions are self-contradictory because the incentives 
underpinning the two missions are competing with each other in the following ways.  
 
First of all the MCIs are born with the social mission to help the poor which is 
attached to the contribution to at least the first six Millennium Development Goals, 
e.g. eradicating poor and hunger as well as empowering women, etc (Greeley 2006:8). 
This is a mission delegated by the society at the opportunity cost of giving up other 
options for similar purpose, such as work-for-food programs. In other words, if MCIs 
are unable to reach the poor, there is no rationale for society to continue to support it 
because the resources can go to other options. It is believed that “MFIs11 that do not 
deliberately and rigorously target poor households are unlikely to make any difference 
 MDG attainment” (ibid:3). Therefore, MCIs’ outreach to the poor, or its 
ll 
shrin
live
peop
society for subsidized resource, which from society point of view is worthwhile 
intain 
stainability, the MCIs generally need to seek financial support, usually in the form 
                                                       
to
contribution to MDGs lay down imperative basis for its legitimacy of existence. On 
the other hand “the society care about the poor both now and in the future” (Schreiner 
1996:2), thus financial self-sufficiency matters because “an MFO without profits wi
k and die when donors withdraw” (ibid). In contrast, “an MFO with profits can 
 grow without donors, and life and growth means more help for more poor 
le” (ibid). In addition, the profit can be regarded as fund that MCIs repaid to 
because “it benefit for the poor at no cost to society” (ibid).  
 
Consequently in order to expand coverage of more poor and at the same time ma
su
of loans or equity from external environment. The difficulty emerges then because  
“MCIs face serious risk of “mission drift”, concentrating on achieving 
outstanding financial performance, which is necessary anyway and especially if 
they wish to access commercial funds, and neglecting their social mission” 
 
11 “Microcredit” and “Microfinance” as well as “MCIs, MCOs, MFIs and MFOs” are interchangeably used in 
many references. To remain loyalty to the reference they will be quoted as what they are in this thesis. 
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 (Greeley 2006:3).  
To sum up sound MCIs shall be those attaining equilibrium between their social 
mission and financial self-sufficiency with least “mission drift” though in reality only 
a small number of them can manage to achieve the goal (Simanowitz 2003:5).  
 
The duality of MCI makes measurement of it “too odd to fit to traditional framework” 
(Schreiner 1996:3). Therefore the term “social performance” has been ushered in and 
accepted by many scholars to cover the broad concern that MCIs casted in social and 
economic respects (including poverty), which together with “financial performance” 
constituted the MCIs’ “double bottom line” (Copestake 2003:54; Greeley 2006; 
Simanowitz 2003:1). In responding to the “double bottom line” a measurement 
framework was put forward by Schreiner (2002, 2003) aiming at assessing the social 
impact, mainly the outreach to the poor as well as the financial performance of MCIs.  
 
The framework is composed of six dimensions. They are worth and cost to users, 
epth, breadth, scope and length (ibid; Copestake 2003:54). Briefly speaking, depth 
ain, where net gain is worth to clients minus cost to clients. 
rvice, and scope is types of service 
ontracts. The social benefit of the outreach of a microcredit organization is net gain 
or. For detailed 
efinition of the six dimensions please see attached appendix 2.  
4.1 Why Two GCIs with Two Analytical Units 
d
is the social value of net g
Breadth is number of clients, length is years of se
c
weighted by depth, summed across breadth of clients and across scope of contracts, 
and summed and discounted through length of time (Schreiner 2002:12). Of all six 
dimensions, length is the one measuring MCIs’ financial self-sufficiency while the 
rest five are benchmarks for assessment of outreach to the po
d
 
4. METHODOLOGY  
 
 
Limited by time and budget it is impossible for the author to conduct large scale 
sampling and survey across dozens of GCIs simultaneously. An in-depth exploration 
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 over one or two cases will be a cost effective remedy fit to the research aim for 
“analytical generalization” to examine the obstacles (Yin 2003:32). 
 
In order to find out answers for the two questions two analytical units are embedded 
around the outreach framework for outcome assessment and the five modules of the 
“throughput” unit of analyses, namely strategy, system, structure, HRM and culture.  
 
Two cases were selected considering that conclusions from even two cases are more 
inning case selection in this study is to expand the 
 cases with discrepancies in as many 
respects as possible. Several basic criteria were chosen as pinpoint the 
a ze, financial 
sources and scale, running terms, rough organization structures and manpower. 
E o GCIs were ta
Funding the Poor Cooperative under the Chinese Academ cial Science (FPC 
u ASS, case 1) and the T r
Development Institute (TFMF under FDI, case 2). Please see below table 1 for the 
able 1 Criteria Specification of Two Cases 
powerful than from only one (ibid:53). In addition, if under varying circumstance 
common conclusions still have been arrived by the two cases, the generalizability of 
the result can be immeasurably expanded (ibid). A more practical rationale came from 
the pre-research desk review which informed the author that the third category GCIs 
revealing wide spectrum of diversities in terms of size of targeting groups, financial 
sources and scale, running terms, etc. The finding convinced the author of necessity to 
take at least two cases into account although no more can be reached constrained by 
time and resource.  
 
The critical logic underp
representativeness domain by filtering the
benchmarks to 
dequate GCIs. They comprised the identity of the institution, project si
ventually tw rgeted given above criteria and principles. They were 
ic of So
nder C uanshuitou Fuping Microc edit Fund under the Fuping 
specifications of criteria:  
T
 Case 1  FPC Case 2  TFMF 
Starting year of first project 1994 1993 
Identity of the running More closely linked with Grass root NGO 
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 institutions government 
Total project amounts 4 1 
Total counties that projects cover 4 1 
Total investment of fund  1.87 million US$ 0.16 million US$ 
Project size  45,000 poor used to receive 
the loans 
4,000 households used to 
receive loans 
Financial source Multilateral  Single  
Organization structural level 5 levels  3 levels  
Staff  6 professional in headquarters, 1 credit supervisor in 
branch staff were locally 
employed  
headquarters, branch staff 
were locally employed. 
Source: Cheng and Xu, 2007: 94, Du, 2007: 5, Du 2007, CASS 
http://www.cass.net.cn/file/2007040690270.html as well as Mao, 2006: 84 
 
As the table reveals the FPC is a GCI receiving more investment funds from 
multilateral channel, covering larger area and targeted groups and employing more 
complicated organizational structure whereas the TFMF is comparatively smaller and 
simpler with less funds from less channels. One more rationale to select the two i  thats  
FMF is a locally born GCI which therefore has not completely followed suit of the 
pical Grameen running model. It can enrich the analysis’ validity as a complement 
 institutions selected belonged to the first 
atch participating in the initiation of GC in China as early as around 15 years ago.12 
two case design embedded with two units of analyses13.  
Case study itself doesn’t have prejudice against any methods. As McGregor 
(2006:201) pointed out “[it] requires the use of a wide range of methods that may 
combine qualitative and quantitative techniques…”. In this research both quantitative 
and qualitative methods have been used comprising of interviews, observation and 
semi-structured questionnaire survey.   
 
                                                       
T
ty
to FPC that has adopted very typical Grameen running model. The author 
intentionally chose GCIs running for long terms in thinking that 1) they accumulated 
abundant experience and materials for research; 2) if they, as the forerunners, were 
confronted with bottlenecks, other new players might face them with much more 
difficulties. Given above concerns, both
b
In brief the study applies a 
 
4.2 Methods  
 
 
12 For field offices locations of the two selected GCIs please see the map in appendix 3. 
13 For layout of the case study design please see appendix 4    
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 4.21 Interviews in Beijing 
 
The interviews in Beijing encompassed in-depth interview with one expect from 
NSMD and several times of interviews with key informants from the two GCIs’ 
headquarters in December 2008 and January 2009. 
 
It started with in-depth interview with Mr. Chu Yinghuan, head of the NSMD. The 
two-and-half hour interview was unfolded around the updated profile of GCIs in 
urrent China, which provided me valuable clues and enlightenment for next step 
e institutions and projects. The sequence 
as arranged in an effort to encourage the interviewees to release as much 
municative mood. There was a pleasant 
c
interviews. Latter on December 2008 in-depth interviews were carried out with Mr. Li 
Naiwei, the chief officer of TFMF and Mr. Li Yiqing, the dean of microcredit office 
under CASS in charge of the operation of FPC. The interviews were conducted in 
their office in Beijing in rather open-ended manner although I did draft dozens of 
questions referring to the overall running and characteristic of two institutions. An 
open-ended manner was preferred because it provided room for interviewees and me 
to make “a mutual exploration of the issues without the author imposing his or her 
ideas” (Nichols 1991:13).  
 
The interviews were divided into two phases. In first phase the interviewees were 
invited to make free introduction on the institutions and relevant microcredit projects. 
Details were recorded through notes and digital recorder. Omitted or missed issues 
were picked out to be double checked with the interviewees. In the second phase 
interviewees were asked to express their own remarks, advices and suggestions over 
the performance and running systems of th
w
information as possible in a relaxed and com
interaction between the author and interviewees since both two interviewees behaved 
actively and were willing to talk. Information obtained from the interviews was very 
helpful either for understanding the institutions’ structure, mechanism and running 
style or for the design of semi-structured questionnaire which later was used in the 
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 author’s field visit to two GCIs’ targeted areas. Based on data from field visits second 
time interviews were conduced again on January 2009 with the heads of two GCIs in 
Beijing to finally clarify uncertain details.  
 
4.22 Observation and Interviews in the Field 
. Another 
xample was there was once when the credit supervisor accompanied the author out, 
 
One of the most effective methods to seek the first hand impression and materials on 
the running of two GCIs was to visit and observe their local branch where the 
microcredit programs were delivered. FPC’s programs covered four counties in three 
provinces in northern China, of which Yixian bureau in Yixian county, Hebei 
province was the first and a very typical one and therefore it was selected. TFMF’s 
coverage was limited in Tuanshuitou town of Linxian county, Shanxi province, which 
naturally became the author’s another visit destination.  
 
The author first visited TFMF’s field office in Tuanshuitou town between Dec. 9-11 
2008 and later visited FPC’s field office in Yixian county between Jan. 7-9 2009. 
Observation was taken as the main tool during author’s visit to the field because “it 
provides context for sampling, open-ended interviewing, construction of interview 
guides and questionnaires” (Dewalt and Dewalt, 2002:2). Local households’ daily 
lives, the branch working venues, staff’s working procedures, attitudes and behaviors 
as well as local residents’ reaction to microcredit were main observation objects, 
which to certain extent implied the outcome efficiency of the two GCIs. The 
observation could take place anytime, for example the author noticed in Tuanshuitou 
Town that locals only had two meals per day, with meat to be luxuries enjoyed only in 
weekend or holiday, which laterally implied the poverty level of the region
e
the supervisor were seen to be warmly greeted by every local encountered to whom 
the supervisor responded immediately by telling every greeter’s name with ease. It in 
some way manifested the supervisor’s good relationship and familiarity within the 
neighborhood, which was one of the crucial qualifications that a sound loan officer 
should possess. Apart from these primary details, observation data also provided solid 
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 grounds for the finalization of the interview questions and the semi-structural 
questionnaire later used in surveying the household members. During observation, 
camera was used to capture image-form materials in addition to transcripts. 
 
Coincided with observations, in-depth interviews were conducted separately with 5 
staffs in Yixian branch of FPC, including the branch head, 2 loan officers and 1 
accountant; in Tusnshuitou town, in-depth interviews were conducted with the chief 
credit supervisor, one teacher in town primary school and one volunteer in school 
library which had connections with TFMF microcredit program. Compared to the 
terviews in headquarters which were more generalized in content, the interviews in 
eld tried to focus more on on-site services and customer relationship that GCIs 
4.23 Semi-structured Questionnaire Survey  
 semi-structured questionnaire was designed based on data from previous key 
in
fi
developed with targeted clients in branch and community level. Interviews to the 
branch leaders of two field offices were repeated multiple times as sometimes new 
questions came out after reflection. When talking with the loan officers they were 
noticed a little nervous facing the digital recorder, so the author finally turned it off 
and took notes by hand. To avoid disturbing the loan officers’ normal works the 
interviews were generally not longer than 1 hour, even though the results were fruitful 
in complementing the first hand data on the institutions’ reach to end clients.  
 
 
A
informant interviews. The semi-structured format was preferred over completed 
structured or open-ended ones due to its advantage of combining some structured 
questions to obtain basic information with others permitting more flexible answers to 
convey ideas or perceptions in an open-ended manner (Simon 2006:166). The aim of 
the survey was to testify data obtained through previous in-depth interviews and to 
explore potential information of targeted beneficiaries that could only be uncovered 
through face-to-face interviews, e.g. the poor households’ basic facts as well as their 
direct comments and feedbacks on the microcredit services provided by the two GCIs.  
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 The questionnaire was divided into two parts by living up to the “golden rule” of 
“commencing with the most basic and uncontentious—usually factual—information 
using structured questions” and “moving the contentious or controversial subjective 
questions towards the end” in view of minimizing interviewee’s offence (ibid). The 
first part was designed to collect the basic household information, particularly living 
conditions for poverty measurement, which comprised of five sub-category indicators, 
e.g. housing, public service, education, health, labor and income. In designing the 
questions Navajas’s (et al. 2000:16-17) index of basic need and Greeley’s (2003:14) 
poverty scorecard had been taken as reference which not only underlined factors in 
lated to income poverty but also to social well-being powerlessness. Apart from 
r FPC, Yixian county bureau is composed of 4 
ranch offices providing services in 14 towns out of the total 28 towns in Yixian 
households in Tuanshuitou village, which possessed the largest scale loans and clients 
re
income, questions in the other four categories applied proxy indicators which were 
easy to collect and believed reliable for well-being measurement (Ruit and May 
2003:22). Information from the first part played important role in assessing GCIs’ 
outreach to the poor. The second part was designed to inquire details of the 
microfinance services by concentrating on four dimensions of the outreach, e.g. worth, 
cost, depth and scope. Breadth and length were excluded from the question list 
because they were beyond the answer range of clients and could be pursued through 
other channels such as interviews with GCIs staff, observation, etc14.  
 
Limited by time and operative feasibility the surveys were controlled to be carried out 
in 20 households for each GCIs. Fo
b
county. Under the 4 rural branch offices there are 175 community centers in village 
level directly dealing with the clients for daily loaning and repayment (FPC 2008:10). 
The survey was conducted by random sampling 20 client households under the branch 
office of Dongbaima town since it was comparatively close to be reached. The 
selection for TFMF is comparatively easier since its microcredit service covered only 
six villages in Tuanshuitou town. It was conducted by random sampling 20 client 
                                                        
14 For the semi-structured questionnaire used please see appendix 5. 
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 in the six villages (TFMF 2008:2).  
 
Concerning the literacy degree and time limit, the questionnaires were filled in by the 
author based on Q&A15 communications with the households. The surveys varied 
from 30 to 40 minutes for each household with the first 15-20 minutes contributing to 
questionnaire filling-in and the rest for informal interviews. The rationale to combine 
interviews with questionnaire survey was to let them complement each other to catch 
 multi-facet and holistic picture of the project and to inform the author of the service 
vey one loan officer was assigned to 
research 
hases. In data collection phase the author tried to access evidence from multiple 
ollected from multiple sources were triangulated to 
sign phase the two cases were carefully sifted 
a
quality from client’s perspective. During the sur
help the author to make contact with the households. Considering the officer’s 
presence might sway the neutral mindset of respondents, they were asked to stay in 
other rooms when the author was making survey with the household members. Most 
respondents were quite cooperative though there was one in each survey unwilling to 
answer pro-sensitive questions like annual household income. All in all the survey 
results were reliable for use. 
 
4.3 Validity, Generalization and Limitation  
One of the major barriers in doing case study is the external validity, which 
emphasized to establish a domain to which the research result or findings could be 
generalized. (Kidder and Judd 1986:26-29 cited in Yin 1993:34). To overcome the 
barriers efforts were made to strengthen verification procedures in different 
p
sources through the overlapping use of interview, observation and questionnaire 
survey. Data and information c
reflect back on each other. Such a triangulation was commonly recognized as popular 
and cost-effective procedure for validity enhancement (Creswell 2007:203; Mikkelsen 
2005:197; Yin 2003:99). In research de
out of the third category GCIs domain by using criteria to identify “contrast” cases to 
maximize representativeness and generalizability of the research conclusion. 
                                                        
15 Question and answer 
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In spite of the effort, there are two factors undermining the validity and 
small sampling scale and 
varying context of different areas.  
terview the competitors vs. the third category GCIs, 
 
reachable sources, e.g. reports and documents 
 
generalizability of the research: 
1. It is negotiable that whether the questionnaire survey result can be extrapolated to 
other communities served by the two GCIs given the 
2. It will be more holistic to in
mainly state-run institutions and officials working in financial industry. However 
this proved to be a huge challenge due to hard-accessibility caused by 
bureaucracy. 
To offset the deficiency caused by factor 2 more efforts were put on the use of 
“naturally occurring data” through 
released in official websites and open archives (Yin 2003). 
 
4.4 Ethical Considerations   
Research independence: Informed by the fact that some parts of the research involved 
the assessment over targeted GCIs, the author had been trying to maintain a critical 
and independent manner during observation and data collection practice so as to avoid 
any misleading or prejudice caused either intentionally or unintentionally by 
stakeholders from researched side.  
 
About interview and survey: In any case the “informed consent” principle was strictly 
arch purpose and methods were clearly explained to interviewees 
nd survey respondents in advance. Confidentiality was specially highlighted 
their names in the paper. There was 
h was conducted in the author’s own country. It 
ccurred in two or three surveys when the rural households could not understand the 
abided by. The rese
a
beforehand to all. Fortunately none of the interviewees and respondents rejected to 
give their names, nor they insisted anonymize 
small cultural shock even the researc
o
author’s “formal language” whereas the author failed to catch the local’s dialects. A 
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 re-inquiry was insisted under such circumstance to clarify the uncertainty.  
 
5 ANALYSES  
 
 
The analyses are divided into two parts. Sections 5.1-5.3 respond to research question 
1 while sections 5.4-5.7 respond to question 2.  
5.1 Outreach Assessment of FPC  
 
Worth: Worth dimensions of a loan mainly include the amount disbursed, the term to 
maturity, and the size of the installment (Schreiner 2002:3). For deposits, worth 
increases with the interest rate and as the contract is less restrictive (ibid).  
 
The loan provided by FPC to the poor totaled US$17.5 million by the end of 2006, 
covered 45,000 households (Du et al 2008:22). The average loan borrowed by clients 
thus was US$389. The loan size might vary from one bureau to another. Taking 
ixian bureau for example, by the end of November 2008, there were over $1.53 
manded to be paid together with installment 
payment weekly (ibid). The deposit could be withdrawn one year later if only loans 
of all five group members were cleared off (interview with Li Y.Q. 2009). For FPC II 
Y
million loan being disbursed to 5,358 households, thus the average loan was $286 
(interview with Li Y.Q. 2008). Similar to GB which developed two generation models 
to adapt to the clients as time went by, FPC also evolved generation II in 2005. The 
term to maturity in FPC I followed the traditional Grameen I model to give one-year 
loan by dividing it into 50 installments to be paid back weekly starting from the third 
week after the loan was released (FPC Manual 2007). The FPC II enriched the service 
type to allowed loans to be repaid by flexible installments or lump sum within a term 
of 9 months (ibid).   
 
Deposit was compulsory. For FPC I a forced “group saving” equating 5% of the loan 
would be deducted when the loan was released (ibid). Other than that, a compulsory 
saving up to 1‰ of the loan was de
re
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 no “group saving” required, but a management fee equating 1% of the loan had to be 
paid when borrowing the loan (FPC Manual 2007). The weekly compulsory saving 
rate also increased from 1‰ to 2‰ for members (ibid). The deposit could not be 
withdrawn until the member joined FPC for three years and under the condition that 
loans of all five group members were cleared off (interview with Li Y.Q. 2009). The 
interest on deposit was equal to the official interest on current deposit released by 
central bank16, which was rather low.  
 
Cost: The price cost included cash payment for loan interest and fees. Currently the 
annual loan interest rate is 16% for both FPC I and II (FPC Manual 2007), which was 
higher than that of state-owned banks or RCC’s rate but in a moderate level compared 
with the rate of famous MCIs, e.g. for GB the rate was 20% (GB 2007), for BancoSol 
Bank of Bolivia the rate varied between 12%-22% (TheMIXMarket.org 2007). Fees 
comprised the compulsory savings mentioned above. Nevertheless, it would be 
returned to the clients after contracted terms.   
 
The Transaction costs born by clients were too little to be calculated. The loan was 
released to group members in FPC’s community centre which was generally within 
half-hour walk distance from clients’ home (interview and survey with household 
members 2009). When evaluating client’s application for loan and collecting 
repayment, the loan officers would go to clients’ home. Therefore there was nearly no 
opportunity cost for time and transport. Since all registration forms were provided by 
FPC, there was no other indirect transition cost, such as stationery either.  
 
Net Gain: Therefore the net gain to a client for a one-year contract loan of $389 would 
be $288 by using the worth minus the price cost given the assumption of zero 
opportunity cost and indirect transaction cost. But the opportunity cost would not be 
zero and it was hard to measure the loans’ contribution to household welfare 
improvement mostly because of the difficulty to know what would have happened in 
                                                        
16 The latest annual current deposit rate released by the central bank as of Dec. 23 2008 was 0.36%  
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 the absence of the loan. A reliable alternative was to compare the net gain with loans 
from other available sources (Schreiner 2002:6). Survey indicated to borrow from 
PC was more profitable since lending interest rate of private moneylenders was F
higher than FPC. The RCC, on the other hand, requested guarantees with asset of at 
least $4386 while PSB requested public officials to be guarantees of borrowers, which 
as some households claimed were “too trouble and impractical”. There were other 
evidences from the survey proved net gain was positive: 1) over 90% members had 
repeated borrow behaviors (interview to Li Y.Q. and Zhou 2009) 2) being asked 
whether the microcredit brought change to household, 100% respondents confirmed it 
“diversify income sources and increase household income” while over 50% 
additionally agreed “it strengthen household anti-risk capacity”. 
 
Depth: Poverty is a good proxy for depth which however was measured through 
diversified benchmarks in different MCIs. For example, GB put land asset less than 
half hectare as a key criterion to screen the targeted poor (GB 2007); CARD in 
Philippine used mean test form integrating housing, food security, education and 
assets to filter groups they intended to approach (Greeley 2003:11). FPC had applied 
double thresholds for member entry which entailed total household asset as well as 
er capita net income of household members. For FPC I the asset ceiling was less than 
ure should be closed to ￥2,300 
hen the criterion was put forward a few years ago.  
But the standard itself could not identify the distribution of the clients among the 
targeted group. Sun’s (2007) survey in 2002 casted lights on it. Sun sampled 126 
p
￥20,000 (US$2924) and the per capita net income should be less than ￥2,000 
(US$294); for FPC II the threshold were loosened to ￥23,000 (US$3362) and 
￥2,300 (US$336) respectively. The income criterion was formulated taking account 
of the average per capita net income of rural residents of the four counties where FPC 
project located, which reached ￥2765 (US$404) in light of the latest statistic in 2006. 
(Hebei Provincial Bureau of Statistic 2007; Henan Provincial Bureau of Statistic 
2007). In considering the income growth, the fig
w
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 member households from 4 targeted villages in Yixian county and 119 member 
households from 4 targeted villages in Nanzhao counties. According to the average 
per capital net income of the two counties in 2002, which was ￥2360 ($345), Sun 
stratified three income categories and obtained distribution ratio of member 
households of each level to the sampling totality:  
 
Table 2 
Percentage of Member Households against Sampling
Totality According to Per Capital Net Income Stratified
by Three Levels
0%
50%
10%
20%
30%
40%
￥0-1402 ￥1403-2360 >￥2360
Yixian
Nanzhao
 
 
According Table 2, the survey showed in Yixian and Nanzhao there were 67% and 
76% targeted member households of FPC felling i
Source: Sun (2007:65) “Microcredit Targeting and Farmer Household’s Selection of Microcredit” 
n the income domain below 
2360. It justified FPC’s targeting trajectory on low-income rural poor. The table 
d to social performance (Schreiner 
￥
also indicted Nanzhao enjoyed a ratio as high as 43% in targeting the poorest group 
with income less than ￥1402 compared to Yiyan which had a ratio of 27%. The 
main reason might be attributed to the fact that Nanzhao was possessed of 50 
thousand poor with per capital net income less than ￥958 while such poor 
population decreased to around 20 thousand for Yixian (Nanzhao Office Annual 
Report 2008:3; Yixian Office Annual Report 2008:2)  
 
Income poverty was only one benchmark to measure the outreach depth. There were 
simple, indirect proxies in related to gender, housing, education, access to health 
service to reflect MCI’s outreach contribute
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 2003:7). FPC inherited the GB’s preference on women borrowers. The FPC II was 
designed to aim particularly at women members. As a consequence, female members 
accounted for 90% of all members by the end of 2006 (Du 2007). Housing was less 
considered since in China rural families were allowed to build houses on distributed 
land in compliance with population (The Ministry of Land and Resource 200717). 
Survey and interviews in Dongbaima town had verified the average room occupied by 
individual was nearly 1:1, therefore housing was not an essential conditions for 
concern. Education itself was not a premise for loan. However, relevant evidence 
from Yixian and Nanzhao supported the finding that educated women showed higher 
rate of choosing microcredit service compared to those with less education (Sun 
007:73). Besides, families needed to support children to go to school were inclined 
readth:
2
to the loan (interviews with household members 2009). Thus from reciprocal point of 
view education become a factor affecting microcredit’ popularity from clients’ side. 
As a principle the loan was not lent for seeing a doctor, nevertheless, it did not wipe 
out the possibility for members to use small proportion of it for illness and the rest for 
money-earning activities as what they stated in application.  
 
B  It started with one community center, six groups comprising of 34 household 
cope:
members as well as initial capital of ￥30,000 ($4386) in Yixian county and 
expanded to current 4 counties in two provinces (FPC Brochure 2007). Aggregately 
FPC had reached 45,000 households covering over 180 thousand rural poor so far (Du 
et al 2008:22) . Currently there were over 16,000 household were receiving the loan 
from FPC.  
 
S  FPC’s microcredit services could be divided into generation I and II. The loan 
4,000 for the third loan and limited to ￥4,000 
fterwards. FPC II displayed more flexible repayment term and was seeking 
size ceiling for I and II were the same. Households were allowed to borrow loans no 
more than ￥2,000 for the first time which could be increased progressively to 
￥3,000 for the second loan and ￥
a
                                                        
17 According to clause 22, “Land Management Law of P.R.C”. 
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 augmented prevalence in members.  
 
There were not other financial services except for compulsory deposit, which as such 
was regarded as a tool cultivating clients’ saving habit and alleviating bad debt risk of 
PC rather than a kind of service.  F
 
Length: After the project was introduced to China in 1994 FPC had been running 
stably for 15 years. In county level the branch bureaus was capable of handling the 
revenue and expenses with balance. Still financially in headquarters level FPC was 
not able to take full responsibility for its own profits and losses if taking the bad debt 
into account. (Du 2007:18; interview with Li Y.Q. 2008) 
 
Summary: FPC demonstrated positive net gain signs to clients either upon evidence 
om survey or comparison with other available local loan sources. As for depth, it 
 it was effective by using asset and income 
reening criteria in addition with concern on essential social factors. But the service 
fr
varied with county context. Basically
sc
scope was comparatively narrow since apart from loans and compulsory saving there 
were no other services offered. All in all FPC had been making progress steadily even 
though the covering area was limited to 4 counties. It seemed in a short term FPC 
would still confront with pressures for financial self-sufficiency and scaling-up.  
 
5.2 Outreach Assessment of TFMF  
 
Worth: The total loan disbursed by TFMF till the end of 2008 reached ￥9 million 
($1.3 million), covering 4,000 households (Mao 2006:84). Thus the average loan for 
ach household was around ￥2250 ($329). Taking Tuanshuitou, Longshuitou and e
Xiaozhaishang villages for specific example, over 3291 loans was made with total 
sum up to ￥72 million to members in the three villages between 1999 and 2007 
(TFMF Annual Report 2007). Thus the average loan in this period would be 
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 ￥7,200,000/3291=￥2190 ($320). Basically the loans were provided for terms of six 
months and twelve months. Principle and interest would be repaid at lump sum basis 
by contracted terms.  
 
From 1998 TFMF started to accept villagers’ deposit on annual interest rate of 6%, 
which nearly tripled the rate of state-owned banks. In 2006 the rate was lowered down 
to 4% given policy limitation, which however was still higher than the 2.25% interest 
rate for one-year deposit and withdraw in lump sum released by the government 
(Bank of China 2008). Interview to the chief credit supervisor of TFMF confirmed the 
rate would be further reduced to 3% in 2009 owing to the decrease of official rate in 
recent years.  
 
Cost: At the very beginning the annual loan interest rate was 12%, charged only to 
borrowers using the loan for business initiation while loans for going to school and 
eing doctors were free of interest. Starting from 2006 the rate was increased to 18%. 
 of the 
overnment rate is considered as usury and is illegal (Ling 2006:p97). In 2008 the 
se
It would be further increased to 21% in 2009 (TFMF Manual 2009:15; interview to Li 
N.W. 2008). Cautions needs to be raised since according to the updated interpretation 
given by The Supreme People’s Court of China, loan rate four times
g
ceiling was curtailed to 21.24% from previous 24% in 2006 since the government rate 
has been cut down from 5.8% in 2006 to current 5.31% (BOC 2008). Thus there was 
no big room left for TFMF to increased loan interest rate. 
 
There was little opportunity cost for time and transportation since most residents lived 
in loess cave dwellings which spread not far away from the community office. But the 
household need to pay $3 for the membership book used for loan recording.  
 
Net Gain: Given an assumption of zero opportunity and transition cost, the net gain to 
a client for a one-year loan of $329 is $259.4. The survey indicated households 
ferred TFMF over private moneylenders or RCC since for the former the loan rate pre
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 was 24%-30%, which was much higher than TFMF (interviews with households 
2008). The RCC, though having a low loan rate, requested teachers to be guarantees, 
which was a harsh threshold refraining most clients from borrowing (interviews with 
households 2008). The net gain was positive since many clients had repeated borrow 
behaviors, which was further verified by 100% concert of agreement from survey 
respondents remarking the loan “diversified income sources and increased income” 
and 78% additionally deemed it “strengthened household anti-risk capacity”. 
  
Depth: The per capita net income of rural residents in Tuanshuitou town was ￥1153 
($168) in year 2008 (Tuanshuitou town government 2008), which was lower either 
compared with $178 for rural residents in Linxian county in 2006 or with $598 for the 
whole Shanxi province in 2008 (Linxian County Government 2006; Shanxi Provincial 
Bureau of Statistic 2008). Applicants were required to fill in investigation forms 
cusing on information relevant to household asset, annual net income and expenses 
e groups by providing loans for 
hildren’s schooling as well as for members that could not afford to go to the hospital. 
compulsory when borrowers were couples, thus women engagement was as high as 
fo
as well as household’s loans from other channels. TFMF did not set up income 
screening threshold as a “bottom line” for loan release. It relied more on loan officers’ 
assessment capability over applying households. It was believed “only those really 
needy will go for us since generally households here are very poor” (interview to Li 
N.W. 2008). The average per capital net income of 20 surveyed households was 
higher than $168 because of a few big borrows, but the median was around $168, 
indicating the targeting priority to the poor. 
 
TFMF has put particularly concern on vulnerabl
c
The statistic from Tuanshuitou, Longshuitou and Xiaozhaishang villages showed 
between 1999 and 2007, loans disbursed for children’s education and medical cares 
accounted for 4% and 5% of total sum respectively, which meant direct contribution 
to the social welfare improvement of local poor (TFMF Annual Report 2007). All 
loans were disbursed on household basis with wives’ agreement and signatures being 
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 95% in all borrows (interview with Li N.W. 2008) 
 
Breadth: TFMF was founded by Mr. Mao Yushi, a Chinese economist together with 
Dr. Tang Min in 1993. The initiative fund was only ￥1500 ($219). It started in 
Longshuitou village and was slowly expanded to Tuanshuitou and Xiaozhaishang 
villages. In 2007 the coverage was furthered enlarged to reach totally six villages. Its 
next step was to extend to cover all 28 villages under the administration of 
Tuanshuitou town (interview to Mao18 2007 and Li N.W. 2008)   
 
Scope: The ceiling for loan had increased slowly by year from the initial ￥1000 in 
was launched to serve those with extra 
emand for money. It permitted single loan amount between ￥5,000-￥20,000, 
FMF provided deposit service, which contributed over 50% of the loan capital to it 
1998 to ￥2000 in 2000, ￥4000 in 2004, ￥5000 in 2006 till scheduled ￥8000 in 
2009. Starting from 2007, a larger size loan 
d
which however was limited to old clients that had repeated and credible borrowing 
records. Households having such large borrows were limited to 40 for the sake of risk 
control (interview to Li. N.W. and Li L.S. 2008). 
 
T
(Shen 2007:34; interview to Li N.W. 2008).  
 
Length: TFMF has been in operation for 16 years since it was founded in 1993. In 
2006, TFMF’s field offices achieved $5847 surplus (Shen 2007:34). Nevertheless, if 
deducting the cost spent by headquarters, the institution was still in the red (ibid; 
interview to Li N.W. 2008).  
 
Summary: Clients of TFMF could enjoy positive net gain over other local loan 
sources. To intensify depth, TFMF heavily relied on the loan officers’ experience and 
apability in assessing and targeting the poor. Loan for education and health care were 
da from the very beginning, which deepened the 
                                                       
c
integrated into the service agen
 
18 The interview with Mr. Mao was conducted in Oct. 18 2007 in the author’s previous assignment writing. 
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 outreach to the vulnerable. In addition to loans, it also provided deposit service with 
interest rewards higher than official banks. The expansion was not quick since it took 
TFMF 8 years to multiply from 1 village to 3 and another 6 years to current 6. It 
remained in blur that how long it would take for TFMF to realize financial balance in 
headquarters level. 
 
5.3 Similarity and Difference  
 
Similarity: Both institutions tended to achieve positive worth whatever in terms of the 
net gain compared with other loan sources, the repeated borrowing frequency or 
member households’ affirmative feedbacks. The average loan size was between 
￥2250 ($329) and ￥2660 ($389), which was nearly equal to a loan of 1$ per day. 
The price cost for both institutions did not have big divergence since FPC’s annual 
loan interest was 16% and TFMF’s was 18%. The latter was a little higher than the 
rmer, however if considering the compulsory saving enforced by the former, the 
had a very 
fferent approach 
rgeting the poor, over half of the households reached by the two institutions were 
ifference:
fo
total price cost for both was nearly the same. On the other hand they all 
tiny opportunity cost and transition cost. Although adopting di
ta
below the average local income poverty line. In spite of the precise outreach to the 
poor, the expansions of both institutions were slow and financially they had not yet 
been able to achieve balance. 
 
D  there were several differences identified in following respects: 
ome and household asset screening 
riteria in targeting the poor. TFMF relied more on loan officers’ personal credibility 
readth: FPC served more members than TFMF by covering more targeted villages, 
 
Saving: FPC had enforced compulsory saving while TFMF did not. 
 
Approach to target the poor: FPC applied inc
c
and capability for assessment in targeting the poor. It particularly provided loans to 
support households with difficulty for children’s education and health care. 
 
B
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 which however was closed linked to their capital gap from initiative stage and 
investment attracted during their development.  
 
Scope: FPC did not have real deposit service while TFMF did imposing an interest 
higher than official banks. Within loan scope FPC had been making effort to 
customize services by generating FPC II.  
 
The similarity summarized the common ground of the two GCIs’ all-round 
performance. Assessment from the first five dimensions of outreach framework 
owed they had managed to accomplish the social tasks committed to them to large 
firmed the plight of GCIs in Chinese 
ontext shall not be attributed to their lack of sound social performance. It did not 
t there was not room for improvement. On the 
ontrary, they exposed deficiency in service scope which was not diversified; the 
ill limited when expansion was slow; particularly, they still could not 
sh
extent in supporting the poor. On the other hand both of them were slow in 
multiplications and both faced challenges in sustained financial self-sufficiency and 
scaling up. Regardless of the homogeneity in performance, FPC and TFMF exposed 
different approaches in running tactics in some way. Whether and how much did the 
approach difference affect the performance of the two GCIs would be further 
discussed in the following section.  
 
The assessment in this phase clarifies the first research question of this paper—that is 
the social performances of two GCIs are, if not perfect, quite acceptable and shall not 
threaten donors or investors away although financially the “outcome” was not 
outstanding enough to support the reciprocation of organization activities through the 
“feedback loop”. The result preliminarily con
c
mean their output was so satisfied tha
c
coverage was st
support themselves with their own profit. To answer the second question, namely to 
identify the obstacles relevant to such deficiencies the following sections would go 
ahead into the organization capacity analysis. 
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 5.4 Organization Capacity of FPC  
 
The long term goal of FPC was to intensify poverty alleviation development and 
empower rural poor while its original mandate was to explore the feasibility of GC in 
Chinese context (Du 2007:4). In other words FCP had regarded itself as a pilot trial 
for GC’s implementation in Chinese context. To testify the feasibility FPC had made 
a comprehensive duplication of GC in term of the running mechanism and 
management pro
5.41 Strategy  
cedures at the very beginning. Some part of the mechanism, after 
 
munity meetings for 
ommunity buildup given the high opportunity cost of time and female members’ 
ousework burden (Yixian 2008:9). For strategy planning the overall development 
 
many years of practice was proved efficient and adequate to Chinese context whereas 
some were not (ibid). Thus innovation was made in responding to clients’ demand and 
feedback which led to the birth of FPC II for certain technical alternation in relation to 
loan delivery and management, nevertheless, the morals and values underpinning FPC 
remained unchanged which firmly adhered to GC’s ultimate mission to promote credit 
as human right. 
FPC’s strategy was single by concentrating only on microcredit provision. It did not 
follow GB’s mode to mobilize weekly or fortnightly com
c
h
goal, schemes as well as code of conduct was set up by the directorate and conveyed 
to branch bureaus in the counties. However, members shared the rights to elect 
lending group leaders and their voices could be conveyed to local bureau through loan 
officers who visited members’ home at least once per month.  
 
5.42 System 
Lending system: One of the most crucial systems invented by GB for loan 
management was the group-based lending system which demanded individual 
borrowers to form group of five to guarantee and monitor one other (Khandker et al 
1995:12). This system was against the traditional collateral-based one used by 
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 commercial banks in a belief that poor people were still able to use loans in 
productive way and pay them back (ibid). The running principle was “default by one 
group member leads to loss of access for all members” (Schiener 2003:5), namely if 
any one of the members failed to repay loan on time, the whole group would lose 
hoice for future loans, at the same time, the rest members of the group were 
eliminate financial risk thanks to the kinship and acquaintance impacts in 
ral society” (Yixian 2008:4). In FPC II, innovation was made to allow one or two 
c
obligated to share the repayment of default loan. The system, when using group 
members’ accountability to create pressure for contract enforcement, could effectively 
reduce operation cost (Greeley 2003:4). It constituted a complete system together with 
compulsory saving (Khandker et al 1995:12). Although GB later innovated model II 
diversifying way of lending, the group-based mechanism still functioned as key 
methodology for loan delivery.   
 
FPC had taken group-based lending as main framework for loan management. Li 
remarked it “positively against default” (interview with Li Y.Q. 2008). On the other 
hand, the mutual guarantee effect sometimes was not obvious since members were 
observed unwilling to pay default for each other due to lack of understanding on their 
obligations (Du 2007:7). Even though, it was still believed to be “the cost-effective 
method to 
ru
members to use the loan borrowed by all five when the rest members were purely 
guarantors instead of loan users. The lending amount thus was increased to ￥20,000 
(￥4000*5 borrowers =$2914). Interview to Jia (2009), the loan officer of Qiaotou 
town under Yixian bureau, showed over 50% borrowers in Qiaotou town were using 
this kind of loan, reflecting the innovation was responding to clients’ thirst for big 
size loan. 
 
Financial control: There were several variables affecting the financial efficiency of 
MCIs: the loan officers’ productivity and operation cost, the loan interest rate, MCIs’ 
ability to tap external commercial source, such as deposit from public, donation, or 
 equity. It became a common sense that “the administrative costs for tiny microlending
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 are inevitably higher than for normal bank lending” because “lending out a million 
dollars in 100,000 loans of $100 each will obviously require a lot more in staff 
salaries than making a single loan for the total amount”, let along the cost of home 
visits for household appraisal, disbursement and repayment collection as well as 
following monitoring (CGAP 2009). In some cases19 the paradox comes out when the 
rate, though suitable for MCIs and acceptable to borrowers, was opposed to the 
ceiling imposed by the government. In addition to adequate loan interest rate, 
ongoing liquidity and funding are absolutely essential for scaling microfinance 
u experienced more 
vert rise and fall and now was maintaining a loan portfolio of ￥300 thousand per 
cer. The caseload for the two counties saw a trend to resume steady growth 
after 2005 and now was stabilized at 250-290 per officer (see Table 3), which was 
higher than the average benchmark of 208 per officer in Asia area and 216 per officer 
globally investigated by MIX20. (MIX 2006 cited in Patel 2008:7) 
 
Table 3 
“
institutions” (Counts et al 2006:42). In all resources available, GB’s experience had 
justified deposit was an alternative “to minimize dependency on outside borrowing” 
and therefore was definitely as important as other social subsidies or commercial 
equity (Khandker et al 1995:29). 
 
FPC managed to make tortuous growth in loan officers’ productivities during the past 
15 years. Data from Yixian bureau showed the net loan portfolio per loan officer grew 
steadily from ￥234 thousand to ￥357 thousand. Nanzhao burea
o
loan offi
                                                        
19 For example, ACSI, an Ethiopia MCI was suppose to make a rate of 30% in considering the poor infrastructure 
to reach the poor, but constrained by political reality its rate could only be raised to 18% (Counts 2006:87) 
20 The survey was conducted by MIX to cover 184 Asian MCIs and 704 MCIs globally (Patel 2008:1). 
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Source: Drafted by the author based on FPC Annual Income Statement 2000-2007 
 
The operation cost also slightly increased following organization expansion and 
productivity growth. An prominent evidence was the cost for ￥1 loan delivery 
increased from ￥0.02 to ￥0.07 for Yixian and from ￥0.03 to ￥0.05 for Nanzhao 
between 2000 and 2007, which was partly due to increase in employee salary (FPC 
2000-2007). In spite of the cost growth, the loan interest rate was remained at 16% 
evenly in past 15 years. This might be out of concerns for the acceptability of targeted 
households and for FPC’s sensitive role as pilot GC in responding to national 
regulation for rating (interview with Zhou 2009). 
 
Currently FPC was surviving mainly relying on external funding and donations.21 
ne of the most critical issues confronted with FPC was to tap new funding sources O
as loans from Ford Foundation was going to be due (interview with Li Y.Q. 2008). 
However, there were two obstacles hindering commercial funds from flowing in: First, 
FPC was not legally recognized by relevant government regulatory authority and 
therefore had difficulty to receive funding via formal channel due to identity 
ambiguity (interview with Li Y.Q. 2009). The author was informed FPC lost many 
choices to seek large funding because the foreign donors could not be convinced by 
the “unclear legal status” of FCP. Second, even loans flowed in, the complicated 
foreign exchange settlement procedures and regulations to limit settlement to small 
                                                        
21 Grameen Trust provided the first batch of low interest loans for initiation of FPC, followed by Ford Foundation 
nt as a main donor. Others included small portion loans from Citi Group, Australian International Developme
Agency as well as donations from an Taiwan entrepreneur (Cheng and Xu 2007:96; interview with Li Y.Q. 2008) 
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 amount caused big operational inconvenience and extra cost for FCP’s repayment of 
loans to donors (interview with Li Y.Q. 2009).   
 
FCP neither stretched out hands for public deposit. Unlike banks, its deposit was 
constrained to compulsory savings which absorbed only very small and fix quota from 
members. The saving was too limited to contribute to alleviate FPC’s dependency on 
external sources. The public deposit transaction was excluded from FCP’s service 
scope intrinsically because the current law did not permit institutions other than 
commercial banks, RCC and PSB to proceed fund raising activities inclusive of 
deposit and saving.22 FPC definitely did not want to play with fire at a risk of 
offending the law. The legal status ambiguity and prohibition for deposit had set up a 
buffer zone largely barring the external funds away.  
 
Technologic deployment: The technological deployment here referred to the technical 
ols and procedures deployed by FPC in sustaining daily operation. The information 
rterly 
nd yearly basis. The workload for bureau office therefore was progressively heavier 
seload growth (interview with Chen 2009) 
to
exchange between headquarters and field offices were through phone and post at the 
very beginning. Computers were luxuries even for the county bureaus before 2001 
(interview with Zhou 2009). Author observed 3 computers in Yixian county bureau 
office, of which two were donated and no computers at all in town branch office. 
Loan portfolio and accounting data were handled via manual accounting at 
community and town level and compiled into electronic spreadsheets by county 
bureau before being conveyed to headquarters by email on weekly, monthly, qua
a
in the wake of ca
 
FPC had been making effort to explore and develop loan portfolio processing 
software which however was discontinued due to large capital input demand for high 
quality computers and network construction. Currently a set of indicators developed 
                                                        
22 According to clause 176 of the Criminal Law of P.R.C updated on June 29 2006 as well as clause 4 in 
“Enforcement of Ban on Illegal Financial Institutions and Illegal Financial Business” released by the State Council 
of P.R.C validating from July 13 1998. 
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 by CGAP was utilized by FPC for loan quality monitoring and financial viability 
assessment, which could be calculated in excel forms. However the leaders became 
increasingly aware of the urgent need for a more efficient management information 
system in view of institution scaling up (interview with Li Y.Q and Zhou 2009). 
 
5.43 Structure  
For many years FPC could only register its subordinate field office as poverty 
alleviation associations by incorporating
 
 with the local county government. The 
eadquarters could not register as legal corporation until 1999 when it obtained a 
tonomy in scheduling development plans and controlling 
                                                       
h
special authorization from central authority for the first time to officially permit it 
“continue to run microcredit as experiment”23 (Du 2008:22; FPC 2007:2), which 
however still did not clarify its legal status. For running convenience FPC took a 
alternative route by setting up a foundation with one of the private donors24 in 2004 
and attached FPC to the foundation (FPC 2007). It helped in someway yet could not 
solve the issue from the root. The ambiguous identity caused ownership confusion 
and confrontations within the institution since the headquarters, not legally registered, 
was leading and running the field offices, which in turn were legally registered (Du 
2007:20; interview with Li Y. Q. 2008).  
 
Leaving the intricacies aside, structurally FPC constituted five layers, e.g. 
headquarters in Beijing, the county bureau office, the town office, community centers 
and clients in villages (see Figure 3). Each county bureau had one chief, one audit and 
one accountant and each town office was equipped with 4-6 staff inclusive of one 
chief supervisor and three to five loan officers who also worked as part time 
accountant and cashier25 (FPC 2007:13-15; interview with Chen and Jia 2009). The 
field offices enjoyed au
 
23 The authorization was jointly approbated by the general office of the State Council, People’s Bank of China 
and the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development (Du 2008:22; FPC 2007:2) 
24 The private donor was Mr. Yang Lin, a Taiwan entrepreneur  
25 For example, Qiaotou town office under Yixian bureau constituted 1 office chief and 3 loan officers. Each 
officer was responsible for 400 households (interview with Jia 2009).  
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 progress while headquarters supposed to inspect each county offices five times yearly, 
ality was subject to alternation if emergency 
ccurred (FPC 2007:179). Th mitated GB’s layout which constituted 6 
yers but covering a network outreaching the whole country (Dowla and Barua 
007:27). If comparing the proportion of structure level to reaching scale of the two, 
 was ther than flat. Bad accounting took place in Yixian 
ield office in 2000 and 2002, which was exposed with a delay due to the multi-layer 
ommunicative path and the backwardness of management information system (Du 
008:12; interview with Li Y.Q. and Zhou 2009). It strongly implied the necessity to 
treamline the structure. 
igure 3  
 
leaders, who were originally government officials from the county office and were 
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Directorate Organization Chart of FPC 
Headquarters 
Chief Executive 
County Office Nanzhao County Office (Yixian) County Office Yucheng County Office (Laishui) 
Town branch office
Community center
Lending Group 
Training Section Accounting Section
Audit Section 
Client Layer 
Field Office Layer
Individual Client 
Source: Drafted by the author after Du (2008:10) and interview with Li Y.Q. (2008) 
5.44 HRM  
 
At present FPC totally had over 80 staff, of which the six staff in headquarters were 
actually employees from CASS (Du 2008:22). The field staff were mostly educated 
locals or laid-off employed via open recruitment except for the four county bureau 
designated as a consequence of compromise between FPC and local autho
Currently three of them already quitted to become completely FPC staff whereas one
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 still did not give up his official position (interview with Zhou 2009).  
 
The loan officers’ proficiency was uneven as some were experienced professionals 
having working experience in commercial banks26, but more were locals receiving 
iddle-level education yet without any financial work experience27 . Dozens of 
as in a shortage of talents to support scaling up. In headquarters 6 
aff were definitely far from enough to supervise and deal with the heavy loads of 
m
samples proved locals could make excellent field staff not only because they were 
familiar with the region, people, and local culture, but also because they were 
accustomed to the harsh work and living conditions and were therefore less likely to 
leave the organization (Counts et al 2006:86). Such was the case in Yixian county 
where over 82% staff had stuck to their position for over 6 years, displaying 
undoubted loyalty to FPC (Yixian 2008:10) and their work was praised as 
“admirable” by Li (interview with Li Y.Q. 2009)  
 
Even though, FPC w
st
affairs accumulated from 4 county officers, particularly, as Li confessed, they lacked 
talent specializing in microcredit (interview with Li Y.Q. 2009). The field offices 
were not optimistic either as expansion demanded the participation of more qualified 
and experienced loan officers, which as Zhou described “was not easy” due to FPC’s 
nondescript identity threatening will-to-be participants away and the salary and 
well-being which looked not more attractive than vacancies in competitors (interview 
with Zhou 2009).  
 
It did not mean FPC’s merit-based incentive was not efficient. Loan officers’ 
remuneration was made up of fixed base and extra bonus which was in proportion 
with one’s outstanding loan portfolio as well as repayment rate (interview with Chen 
and Zhou 2009). If all loan officers’ did a good job, the in-charge office chief and 
                                                        
26 For instance, Mr. Z
Agricultural Bank’s bra
hao, the chief of Dongbaima town office that author interviewed used to work for the 
nch in Yixian for 15 years (interview with Zhao 2009). 
 For instance, 65% staff in Yixian field office were with degrees of junior college or secondary technical school 
ixian Office Annual Report 2008:10) 
27
(Y
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 account would also be awarded certain bonus. Interview with Chen (2009) showed 
ormally a loan officer’s monthly payment could reach ￥2200-2300 ($336), of 
hich around 30% were bonus. Even though in comparing with the sacrifice of 
”. However, limited 
y running cost sufficient human resource backup would remain as a challenge 
 
e, 
FMF took out proportion of earning to pay for the 8 teachers working in the 
ental primary school in Tuaishuitou village and helped to invite 
n
w
weekends and holidays for home visits and trivial tasks, the payment indeed deserved 
reconsideration. It somehow formed a vicious circle when talented professionals 
flowed into commercial banks lured by their high salary and comfortable working 
environment. MCIs could only seek what were less inspiring. As Li (2008) remarked 
“we need to pay more if we want to hire ideal person as we expect
b
worrying FPC.  
 
5.5 Organization Capacity of TFMF  
5.51 Strategy 
 
As a subordinate under the FDI, TFMF maintained coherence with FDI’s long term 
goal to facilitate social innovation and equality, alleviate poverty and encourage 
sustainable development for the establishment of harmonious society (FDI 2009). It 
endeavored to contribute to the goal by creating self-motivated opportunity for the 
poor via the scaling up of microcredit (ibid).  
 
TFMF’s mandate was incorporated with FDI’s community and civil society 
promoting programs and launched in a “microcredit plus” strategy. For exampl
T
non-governm
volunteer to manage school library for the children (interview with Sun and Zheng 
2008). It also assisted for the establishment and running of Community Learning 
Centre for Women in the town where participants had choice to learn literacy classes 
and have entertainment together, which in turn strengthen their understanding and 
trust on TFMF and the microcredit program (interview with Li L.S. and household 
members). Zhao Huayan, 35, the mother of two boys told the author that she was 
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 pleasant to attend the center because she learned more about how to use the credit and 
ake many friends there (interview with Zhao 2008). It turned out the integrated 
5.52 System 
m
strategy reinforced the viability of microcredit as well as the buildup of community. 
 
 
Lending system: Instead of duplicating the group-based lending mechanism, TFMF 
developed its own methodology by purely relying on household credibility. 
Borrowers were required to make lending on household basis, namely lending 
agreement need to be signed by couples or at least two linear household members if 
the borrowers were single or divorced, e.g. by father and son together. One household 
could borrow only one sum of loan at the contracted period (TFMF 2009:19; 
interview with Li. L.S. 2008) 
 
The system was simple and easy for handle when it also exposed TFMF to larger 
default likelihood since there was not joint-liability guarantee based on groups. To 
minimize the risk TFMF tried to create pressure on borrowers through combination of 
incentive and penalty and publicizing the default to open (TFMF 2009:16; interview 
with Li N.W. 2008). As reward creditworthy members could obtain larger loan 
portfolio in future whereas those defaulted would be punished by paying higher 
terest rate increased from the normal 1.75% to 2.1% monthly (ibid; interview with in
Li N.W. 2008). Simultaneously the default member would be publicized in bulleting 
board located in the community center office monthly. A Creditworthiness Day was 
celebrated on September 15 of every year aiming at raising awareness for “good 
credit” amongst villagers (interview with Li L.S. & household members 2008). “The 
default borrowers will be subject to contempt from neighborhood and felt losing their 
face, which is a big concern for villagers cherishing their reputations” (interview with 
Li L.S. 2008). The outstanding repayment rate verified the efficiency of the system. 
Except for a few default cases due to borrowers natural death and force majeure 
accidents, 98% members repaid their loan on time (TFMF 2007:20; interview with Li 
N.W. 2008). After 2007 the rate was even further improved (ibid).  
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Financial control: TFMF covered only six villages, thus the loan portfolio and 
aseload of per loan officer was constrained by circumstance and might not be 
vertheless, 31% as such was not a low 
overage rate. In 2009 TFMF decided to expand services throughout the 28 villages 
uanshuitou town (TFMF 2009). Whether the expansion could bring 
productivity surge needs further observation.  
 
In the past five years the operation cost ratio28 of TFMF was comparatively even, 
with slight rise and fall within the spectrum of 1%. In 2007 it saw an obviously 
decrease from previous 6.49% to 5.51%, implying TFMF made particular effort on 
expenditure control (see below Table 4). The ratio was a little bit lower than the 
average ratio of 6% for Asian MCIs and 7% globally (MIX 2006 cited in Patel 
2008:8). Of all operative cost salary was the largest proportion which accounted for 
2% of total cost for 2007 (TFMF 2007:20) 
                                                       
c
suitable criteria for productivity measurement. An alternative was to compare the ratio 
of current member households to the total households of the villages. The ratio for 
Tuanshuitou, Longshuitou villages were both around 31% and up to 60% for 
Xiaozhaishang village (TFMF 2007; Tuanshuitou Town Government 2008). The ratio 
for the former two was comparatively lower perhaps due to the earlier intrusion of 
microcredit into these two villages. As a result some households have come off 
poverty and quitted from the program. Ne
c
under T
7
 
Table 4 
 
28 The ratio was calculated by using the formula of “Total operating costs /Average net outstanding portfolio X 
100%” taken from CGAP MIS Handbook for MFIs (Waterfield and Ramsing 1998:60) 
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 Operation Cost Ratio of TFMF
6.00%
6.34%
6.14%
6.49%
5.00%
5.40%
5.60%
5.80%
6.00%
6.40%
6.60%
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
5.51%
5.20%
6.20%
 
Source: Drafted by the author after data from TFMF Annual Operation Report (2005-2007) 
Of TFMF’s $175 thousand fund resource, 40% were donations and 60% were savings. 
Within the $105 thousand savings around 55% were from loca
 
l households (Shen 
007:34; interview with Li N.W. 2008). It was not an overstatement to say savings 
 Regulatory Commission visited TFMF in view of 
constructive idea exchange” (Shen 2007:34; interview with Li N.W. 2009). TFMF 
iculty in absorbing commercial funds due to legal recognition of 
2
contributed over half resource which significantly supported TFMF’s development. It 
did not mean TFMF was exempted from the risk of being suited for illegal fund 
raising. Actually how to define and interpret “illegal fund raising” itself was subject to 
controversy since it sternly restrained the deposit service to official banks and 
deprived any civil financial organizations of the credential for engagement (Zhu & 
Zhu 2008). TFMF was an exception bypassed by legal sanction largely due to its 
founder, Mr. Mao’s personal prestige in society. In Mao’s words, “The government 
just feels ill at ease to put me into jail after witnessing what I have done” (interview 
with Mao 2007). The subtlety was fully demonstrated by the self-contradictory 
reaction of different powerful authorities— in 2001 and 2004 the county government 
ordered TFMF to close down by releasing official documents, whereas in 2005 the 
vice chairmen of Chinese Bank
“
also faced diff
identity. Thus the external funds it raised were largely donations. 
 
Technological deployment: Working circumstances and facilities in the field offices 
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 were modest. The office was set up in one of the loess caves of credit supervisor’s 
home, with one donated computer and one printer to be the total asset. There was no 
ternet access in the field offices until 2004. Prior to that connection between the 
t present TFMF constituted three structural layers, namely the microcredit section in 
quarters in Beijing, the field office in Tuanshuitou town and the client 
re 5). The Beijing office constituted one office chief and two 
taff; field office included one edit supervisor, one part time accountant and 
e cashier, as well as five fully time loan officers with each taking care of 
y chief credit supervisor) 
as a new layout validating from 2009. Before 2009 there were 
e loan officers which currently were downsized to five full time ones. In 
ads were too heavy, from 2009 each village would invite one 
olunteer to work as coordinator assisting the loan officer for household investigation 
in
field and headquarters mainly depended on phone and post (interview with Li L.S. 
2008). Currently the loan portfolio and cash flow accounts were recorded manually 
and reports were conveyed to the headquarters weekly through email. Indigenous 
knowledge was taken for reference in designing the accounts, but the field office has 
not adopted systematic indicators for loan quality and risk assessment, which was put 
into the development agenda of 2009 following the expansion of TFMF (TFMF 2009). 
Still limited by budget and the education level of staff this would not be an easy task 
(interview with Li N.W. 2008). 
 
5.53 Structure 
 
Harassed by the lack of legal endorsement from official regulatory authority, TFMF 
was run as a program under FDI instead of an independent corporation. However, the 
status definitely could not meet TFMF’s viability and ambition for scaling up, which 
became the critical structural obstacles against TFMF’s capacity development in long 
term view.  
 
A
FDI’s head
households (see Figu
s  chief cr
one part tim
one village (Tuanshuitou village was directly in charged b
(TFMF 2009:3). This w
14 part tim
case the officers’ worklo
v
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 and appraisal, loan monitoring as well as community works (ibid:8-9). The revision 
de after years of community development during which villagers’ 
articipatory awareness to community activities were step by step intensified. TFMF 
 revision would enable a more “cost-effective” and “dynamic” structure 
nterview to Li N.W. and Li L.S. 2008). Whether the structure was more robust was 
Source: Drafted by the author after TFMF Manual 2009 and data from interview with Li N.W. and Li 
nt to 
eijing headquarters to receive professional training in turn.  
FMF also undertook merit-based incentive by linking staff’s performance with 
, which was divided into basic salary plus performance bonus and annual 
was ma
p
believed the
(i
subject to the future verification, but it did imply TFMF’s capability to adapt to and 
make use of local advantages.  
 
Figure 5  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.S. 2008 
 
5.54 HRM 
 
TFMF’s staff were all locally employed, even the chief in Beijing office was 
promoted from local office after working for 10 years in the field, therefore all staff 
were very familiar with the field people and circumstance. Loan officers were 
required to be graduates from at least junior middle school and would be se
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 bonus in light of loan portfolio and repayment rate. The basic salary for chief credit 
supervisor, accountant, cashier and loan officer were respectively $117, $88, $73 and 
$88 (interview to Li Naiwei 2008). There would not be any bonus if the repayment 
rate could not reach 99%. The largest human resource challenge was to find qualified 
loan officers and management talent to meet the need of scaling up. According to Li 
Linshun (2008), many educated youth preferred to look for jobs in the nearby county 
or cities, particularly when the payment to loan officers did not appear much more 
competitive compared with the opportunity to work as jobbers or migrant workers. 
or example a storekeeper working in county manufactory could earn a monthly wage 
Similarity: 
F
of $117, with less workload than loan officers. It was even harder to hunt supervisors 
having financial or microcredit experience given wage and fringe benefit 
incomparable to RCC or banks, let alone TFMF was not a legally recognized 
institution, which further counteracted the attractiveness to talents in the field.   
 
5.6 Similarity and Difference  
 
 
 
fforts had been made to improved cost effectiveness by increasing loan officers’ 
orts made by the organizations 
 
Strength: Although the strategies of the two institutions were different, they were 
clearly defined and the short term mandates were consistent with their long term goal.
E
productivity and controlling expenses. Indigenous human resources were prioritized 
which brought win-win benefit to local employment market as well as to institution 
itself since locals were more familiar with environment and people and adapted to the 
harsh living conditions. The performance-based incentive undertaken by both 
institutions was good at stimulating staff’s enthusiasm. 
 
Weakness: Both institutions were beset by the ambiguity of legal status which not 
only severely undermined organizations’ capacity in attracting commercial funding 
but also induced ownership confusion and management attrition within the 
organizations. The input insufficiency in turn offset eff
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 towards outreach and financial self-sufficiency. Limited by the input, there was little 
possibility to upgrade the hardware and software of technical deployment, which 
currently could not match with the information management and evaluation demand. 
ollowing institution scaling up human resource deficiency turned out to be a crucial 
nfronted by both institutions due to legal status perplexity and 
 not separately analyzed in the two cases since it was presumed 
 be relatively uniform to all rural residents in national level. Traditionally borrowing 
mics in 2006 implied the 
formal borrowing exceeded 55% in all lending resource in rural area (Li 2006). In 
F
challenge co
uncompetitive income and welfare treatment given cost control and input shortage.   
 
Culture: Culture was
to
and lending had been taken as a matter of course by Chinese who admired the 
creditworthiness of repayment by describing it in a proverb of “repay the loan if you 
owe as give your life if you kill29”. Currently in rural financial market lending 
behaviors via informal sources were overwhelming formal sources of banks, RCC or 
PSB. A survey sampling 3000 rural households across 10 provinces released informal 
lending accounted for 70% of loan behaviors (Li and Zhu 2006); another report 
presented by Central University of Finance and Econo
in
any case it justified informal lending behaviors was psychologically accepted and 
popularly practiced by Chinese rural households across the country. 
 
Difference:  
 
Strategy: FPC’s strategy was single and concentrated only on microcredit while 
redit plus” strategy integrating microcredit target with 
ommunity buildup. 
TFMF adopted a “microc
c
 
Lending system: FPC duplicated the typical group-based lending system from GB 
whereas TFMF relied only on household credibility without joint-liability. As a 
component of the group-based system, members of FPC were compelled to pay small 
and fixed amount of savings. Scrupling the risk of offending the law FPC did not 
                                                        
29 Originated from “What Donggu Sees” by Li Zhiyan, Song Dynasty.  
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 provide unlimited saving service to members. In contrast TFMF provided normal 
deposit service to all members in an interest rate higher than commercial banks, which 
bought in substantial input as well as great risk to TFMF. 
 
Structure: FPC had five organizational layers and TFMF had three, which was in 
related to the scale and coverage of the two institutions. Even though, there was room 
for FPC to flat its structure and decentralized the power to field branches since to 
certain extent the multi-layer hierarchical structure hindered information flow and 
creased management cost.  
 
in
 
5.7 Obstacles Identified  
The similarity and difference analysis indicated that obstacles spring from both GCIs 
themselves as well as from input and external environment. The latter even held 
particular weight. In the difference identified, the discrepancy of development 
strategies and lending system were proved not to be the inducement triggering 
outcome pitfalls since regardless of the discrepancies, they both performed positive 
results. FPC’s multi-layer hierarchical structure was one of the internal obstacles 
affecting its management and cost control efficiency. Other than that, the weak 
capacity to tap new commercial funding, the incapable technological deployment and 
the insufficient human resource were three obstacles fundamentally born out of the 
binding of external laws and institutions even though they eventually functioned to 
affect the organization from inside. The presence of the three obstacles was in line 
with the finding from other researches which realized their common occurrence in 
many GCIs (Du 2007:19-22; Cheng & Xu 2007: 102-104). 
 
The weak capacity to tap commercial funding was largely due to the ambiguity of 
legal status which threatened donors and investors away as well as the deposit 
constraint which deprived MCIs of authorization for mobilizing savings. The legal 
status dilemma could not be unlocked as long as relevant regulatory authority of the 
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 state, namely the central bank and CBRC remained indifference and unconcern for 
acknowledging the legal status and engaging with the setting of the regulatory rules 
imed at NGO-run GCIs. Currently many GCIs were run in the name of programs 
institutions as what TFMF did, which definitely counteracted 
illingness to increase staff income and renovate 
chnological deployment were both depressed by the input insufficiency, which 
 
a
instead of independent 
the expansion and viability of GCIs in long term view (Cheng & Xu 2007:102; Ren 
2007:81). Deposit constraint on non-officially run financial institutions was another 
external obstacle further compressed GCIs’ surviving space. TFMF was an exception 
that dared to rival the constraint, even though it faced great risk. Its boldness was 
mostly owing to the founder’s remarkable fame in society, which however was an 
unduplicated case. The human resource deficiency also had large to do with the two 
GCIs’ ambiguous legal status which diminished organization attraction to interested 
talents who might otherwise choose to work for them. Thus lack of legal status was 
rendered as the harshest external obstacles staggering the groundwork of GCIs from 
multi-respects. At the same time the w
te
originally was linked to the weak capacity to tap commercial funding source. The two 
external obstacles and three internal obstacles were causally interrelated and their 
synergy directly delayed institution expansion, impeded deposit and other financial 
service as well as the approach for financial self-sufficiency.  
6 CONCLUSION  
 
In response to the two research questions, the outcome assessment revealed positive 
signals showing the two GCIs’ social performance were quite acceptable even they 
still could not live without donor support. By and large it denied the suspicion that the 
GCIs’ status quo was owing to their poor performance. The organizational capacity 
analyses identified three internal obstacles and two external obstacles which were 
causally interrelated and synthetically interacted to lead to the outcome deficiency. It 
was believed that the five obstacles could be generalized to at least some other GCIs 
based on the representativeness of the selected cases and the essence of the obstacles 
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 which were largely provoked by external institutional environment (and hence could 
potentially be applied to other GCIs). 
 
It was noted none of the five obstacles could be removed without an enabling 
 overcome current outcome drawbacks 
nd make big stride towards the fulfillment of twofold mission.  
were still subsidiary companies overwhelmingly controlled by holding commercial 
ere not allowed to exceed 10% (CBRC 
microcredit-friendly environment to call for government concern and commitment for 
modification of incompatible institutions and laws. Going back to the open system 
theoretical model, the intervention crux therefore should be laid in input and 
environment component to first and foremost eradicate two external obstacles 
whereby the GCIs could revitalize themselves in an optimized context if 
administrative modification was undertaken to authorize the legal status of NGO-run 
GCIs; legislative modification was undertaken to lift ban on deposit mobilization to 
permit GCIs for provision of saving and other financial services; regulatory 
modification was undertaken to adequately loosen financial control on loan interest 
rate and simplify procedures for foreign exchange settlement. Actions could be taken 
progressively: for instance, it might be a good idea to separate the credit-deposit GCIs 
from credit-only GCIs to place the former under prudential regulation and the latter 
under non-prudential ones (Chia and Counts 2006). If GCIs could make effort to 
digest the three internal obstacles by synchronizing their steps with the enabling of 
external environment, they were hopefully to
a
 
There is a flash of hope ahead since at the end of 2006 the central government started 
to relax the conditions of entry for banking institutions in rural areas and allow 
investors to set up new types of rural financial institutions such as township and 
village banks, loan companies and rural mutual cooperatives (RMCs) (CBRC 2006). 
In spite of this, it still was extremely difficult for GCIs to legalize themselves by 
transforming or merging into village banks or loan companies due to the entry 
thresholds and the divergence of operating mandates. The township and village banks 
banks within which other shareholders’ stake w
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 2007). It meant that even if GCIs were accepted as stakeholders they would lost the 
ownership, let alone the village banks were suspected to be subject to the same fate of 
ithering as the commercial banks did in rural area (Cai 2009). The loan companies, 
istration was comparatively low30. Zhou 
Xueren (2009), the Yixian bureaun chief of FPC released the plan to test the 
feasibility of transforming the bureau into RMC by launching experiment first in one 
town. However he also confessed “it will definitely take a long time as we need to 
seek support from local government”. Another concern was the “mission drift” since 
essentially RMC was not obligated to target the poor as the GCIs did. Chu’s (2008) 
remarks perhaps pointed out the crux: “the best way is to enable environment that will 
provide strong support aimed at GCIs directly, other alternatives are all second 
means”, which precisely summarized what this study verified and demonstrated.  
 
To sum up, the study contributes to give insight into GCIs’ implementation status quo 
in the Chinese context and systematic identification of obstacles impeding the 
implementation. It pinpoints a baseline for relevant researches aimed to address 
specific obstacles. Potential research may be developed to thoroughly discuss how to 
eliminate any obstacles, such as policy research in terms of the revision and 
improvement of regulatory laws on MCIs. 
                                                       
w
similar to village banks were constrained to be funded by commercial banks and RCC. 
Moreover, as profit-making institutions their running philosophy and goal was 
entirely different from GCIs (CBRC 2007).  
 
The RMCs seemed to be the only one offering potential for GCIs’ development 
orientation since its bottom line for reg
 
30 The registration requires only 10 rural shareholders with total registered capital not less than ￥100 thousand in 
village level and ￥300 thousand in town level (CBRC 2007) 
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 APPENDIX 1 Features Displayed by GC 
 
a) It promotes credit as a human right.  
 
b) Its mission is to help the poor families to help themselves to overcome poverty. It 
is targeted to the poor, particularly poor women.  
 
c) Most distinctive feature of Grameencredit is that it is not based on any collateral, or 
legally enforceable contracts. It is based on "trust", not on legal procedures and 
system.  
 
d) It is offered for creating self-employment for income-generating activities and 
housing for the poor, as opposed to consumption.  
 
e) It was initiated as a challenge to the conventional banking which rejected the poor 
by classifying them to be "not creditworthy". As a result it rejected the basic 
methodology of the conventional banking and created its own methodology.  
 
f) It provides service at the door-step of the poor based on the principle that the people 
should not go to the bank, bank should go to the people.  
 
g) In order to obtain loans a borrower must join a group of borrowers.  
 
h) Loans can be received in a continuous sequence. New loan becomes available to a 
borrower if her previous loan is repaid.  
 
i) All loans are to be paid back in installments (weekly, or bi-weekly).  
 
j) Simultaneously more than one loan can be received by a borrower.  
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 k) It comes with both obligatory and voluntary savings programs for the borrowers.  
 
l) Generally these loans are given through non-profit organizations or through 
institutions owned primarily by the borrowers. If it is done through for-profit 
institutions not owned by the borrowers, efforts are made to keep the interest rate at a 
level which is close to a level commensurate with sustainability of the programme 
rather than bringing attractive return for the investors. Grameencredit's thumb-rule is 
to keep the interest rate as close to the market rate, prevailing in the commercial 
banking sector, as possible, without sacrificing sustain-ability. In fixing the interest 
rate market interest rate is taken as the reference rate, rather than the moneylenders' 
rate. Reaching the poor is its non-negotiable mission. Reaching sustainability is a 
directional goal. It must reach sustainability as soon as possible, so that it can expand 
its outreach without fund constraints.  
 
m) Grameencredit gives high priority on building social capital. It is promoted 
through formation of groups and centers, developing leadership quality through 
annual election of group and centre leaders, electing board members when the 
institution is owned by the borrowers. To develop a social agenda owned by the 
borrowers, something similar to the "sixteen decisions", it undertakes a process of 
intensive discussion among the borrowers, and encourage them to take these decisions 
seriously and implement them. It gives special emphasis on the formation of human 
capital and concern for protecting environment. It monitors children's education, 
provides scholarships and student loans for higher education. For formation of human 
capital it makes efforts to bring technology, like mobile phones, solar power, and 
promote mechanical power to replace manual power. 
 
Source: Yunus, M. (2009) “What Is Microcredit”  
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=108  
Retrieved on Oct. 29 2007 
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 APPENDIX 2 Six Dimensions of the Outreach Framework 
 
Worth is defined as clients’ willingness to pay. Worth hinges on the terms of the 
financial contract and on the tastes, constraints, and opportunities of clients;  
 
Cost is the sum of price costs and transaction costs. Price costs are direct cash 
payments for interest and fees, which are revenue for the microfinance organization. 
Transaction costs are non-price costs for both non-cash opportunity costs—such as 
the time to apply for a loan—and indirect cash expenses for such things as transport, 
documents, and taxes needed to use a financial contract. Transaction costs borne by 
clients are not revenue for the microfinance organization. Combining both worth and 
cost givens net gain, or a measure of value added to clients; 
 
Depth is the value that society attaches to the net gain of a given client. In welfare 
theory, depth is the weight of a client in the social-welfare function; 
 
Breadth is the number of clients. Breadth matters because of budget constraints; the 
wants and needs of the poor exceed the resources earmarked for them;  
 
Scope is the number of types of financial contracts supplied. Scope between products 
might mean both loans and savings services. Scope within a product might mean 
loans to both groups and individuals. Furthermore, scope within a product means 
contracts with different terms;  
 
Length is the time frame of the supply of microfinance. Hence within the “double 
bottom line framework” it falls mainly under financial rather than social performance. 
The profits of the organization are one proxy because, in the absence of guaranteed 
donations, these profits signal some ability to buy resources on the market and thus 
offer some hope to survive if donors leave (Schreiner 2002, 2003; Copestake 2003). 
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 APPENDIX 3 Locations of Field Offices of Two Selected GCIs 
 
 
Source: Marked by the author in google map. 
 
Note:  
The red pin refers to TFMF’s field office in Linxian county, Shanxi province, which is 
around 700km away from Beijing. 
 
The four blue pins refer to FPC’s branch offices in Yixian and Laishui counties in Hebei 
province as well as Nanzhao and Yucheng offices in Henan province. The two offices in 
Hebei province are about 200km away from Beijing; Nanzhao and Yucheng offices are 
about 1000km and 900km away respectively from Beijing.  
 
All five counties are listed as provincial or national level poverty counties by the local 
and central government. 
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 APPENDIX 4 Layout of the Case Study Design  
 
Organization Capacity 
Analysis (unit 2)  
Case1  FPC  Context
Organization Capacity 
Analysis (unit 2)  
 
 
 
Outreach Framework 
（unit 1）  
 
 
 
 
Outreach Framework 
(unit 1) 
Case 2 TFMF Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the left part is from Yin 1993:40 after COSMOS Corporation  
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 APPENDIX 5 The Semi-Structure Questionnaire  
 
Semi-Structured Survey of Yixian County Microcredit Program, FPC  
易县扶贫社小额贷款项目半开放式调查问卷 
 
Part I- Basic Information of Household 第一部分-家庭基本信息 
 
Last Name 姓: ______ First Name 名:_________ Age 年龄:_______ Gender 性别:_________ 
 
How many lineal household members do you have？ (Only limited to parents and offspring)  
请列出您的直系家庭成员数 (只限计算父母子女): _______________________________ 
 
How many children do you have? 请列出您的子女数: __________________________ 
 
A. Housing 居住条件 
 
1. How many people/per room do you have? 您家每间房的居住人数是  
A.  Less than one   少于 1 人  B. 1 person   1 人 
C.  2 person     2 人   D. 3 and above 3 人以上 
 
B. Access to public services 公共设施使用 
 
1. How do you access the source of water? 您家使用的水源来自 
A.  Piped water 自来水 B. Well 井水 C. River or lake 河水或湖水 D. Other source 其他渠道 
 
2.  Do you use indoor toilet or outdoor toilet？ 
A.  Indoor  屋内厕所 B. Outdoor 屋外厕所  
If it’s outdoor toilet, it is about _____ kilometer away from your home 
如果是屋外厕所，离您家大概_____公里 
 
3. Is electricity available for your household? 您家通电吗? 
A.  Yes, it is steady 是，电源稳定  B. Yes, but sometimes it suspends 有时停电 
C.  No 不通电 
 
4. What fuel is used for cooking at your home? 您家做饭用 
A.  Wood 柴禾    B. Coal gas or natural gas 煤气或天然气  
C.  Coal  煤     D. Others  其他燃料 ______________ 
 
C. Education 
 
1. The average education level of couples 夫妻平均教育水平 
Husband : ______ years  Wife : _____ years The average is (husband ＋ wife)/2=____years  
丈夫: ______    妻子: _____ 年  平均水平为 (丈夫＋ 妻子)/2=______年 
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 2. Percentage of children to go to school at your home 家中孩子入学比例 
A. 100% B. 75%  C. 66%  D. 50%  E. 33%   F. 25%   G. 0 
 
D. Access to health services 卫生服务 
 
1. Is there pharmacy and clinic in the town?  No.否  Yes.是 It is____away from home 最近的
药店和诊所离家 
A. 1－3km 公里 B. 4－6km 公里 C. 7－9km 公里 D. 10km and above 10 公里以上 
 
2. Is it affordable for household members to go to see doctor normally? 通常家里人能支付得
起看病的费用吗？ 
A.  Yes  B. Sometimes can not afford  C. Not at all 
 
E. Household labor and income 家庭劳动力和收入 
 
1. In your family, you and your husband/wife 在您家，您和您的丈夫/妻子 
A.  are making living by farming 都以种田为生 
B.  one is farmer and another is migrant worker or self-employed 一个种田另一个打工或做小
买卖 
C.  both are working as migrant workers or self-employed 两个都打工或做小买卖 
 
2. What is your household income by the end of 2008? 截止 2008 年底您的家庭年收入总额是 
A.  ￥4,001-￥6,000 B.￥6,001-￥8,000  C.￥8,000-￥10,000  D. Over ￥10,000 以上  
 
Part II Questions related to microfinance service 小额贷款相关服务信息 
 
A. Worth to client 贷款人获益 
1. How many times have you applied and received loans in the past 8 years？过去的 8 年里您
借过多少次款？ 
A.  1－5   B. 6－10   C. above 10  10 次以上 
 
2. The largest sum of loan you used to receive is up to 您的最大借款额为 
A.  ￥1001－￥3000  B. ￥3001－￥5000  D. ￥5000 above  ￥5000 以上  
 
3. The term of your loan maturity is 您的借款期限为 
A. 9 Months 9 个月   B. One year 一年期  C. I used to applied for both 两样都申请过 
 
B. Cost to client 贷款人成本 
1. How long does it take from your home to the fund office 从您家到贷款办公室要多长时
间？ 
A.  Less than half hour 半小时以内 B. 0.5-1hours 半小时－1 小时 C. 1-2hours 1－2 小时
     
2. Which way do you use to go to the fund office? 
A.  On feet 走路  B. By bicycle 骑自行车 C. By motorcycle 骑摩托车 
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 3. What evidence/documents/license is needed in order to get the loan? (Multi-choice) 申请贷
款需提交的材料包括 （多选） 
A. Application form, ID card，registered residential certificate 信息登记表, 身份证和户口本 
B. Evidence from hospital and school 医院或学校开具的证明 
C. Evidence for business or investment 创业或投资的证明 
D. Other materials 其他材料 _________________________________ 
 
C. Depth 深入度 
1. What do you use the loan for? 你申请贷款的目的是 
A. Farming and husbandry 种植业    B. Small business 小商业 
B. Transportation or processing 运输加工业 D. Other business 其他行业__________ 
 
2. Has the loan bring any change to your household? (Multi-choice) 贷款是否给您家带来任何
变化？(多选) 
A.  Household income sources were diversified 增加了家庭创收手段 
B.  Household anti-risk capacity was strengthen 家庭抗风险能力增强了 
C.  Household income increase 家庭收入增加了 
D.  There is little changes 基本没有变化 
 
D. Scope 服务品种 
1. Is the loan based on group-liability or collateral or just household credibility? (Multi-choice) 
贷款需要小组联保或者抵押担保吗？还是只是基于家庭信誉？(多选) 
A.  Group-liability 小组联保  B. Collateral 抵押担保  C. Household credibility 家庭信誉 
 
2. Is current loaning and paying procedure convenient？现有的借贷和还款程序是否方便？ 
A. Very convenient 非常方便 B. Need to be improved 有待提高 C. Not convenient 不方便 
 
3. Can current loan meet your quantity demand? 现有贷款额度是否能满足您的需要？ 
A. Yes 是  B. Not enough, I need 不够，我需要￥ _______________________ 
 
4. Are you satisfied with current service categories？您对目前小额贷款项目提供的服务种类
是否满意? 
A.  Satisfied   B. Not satisfied  
 
Open Q 1:  Have you ever used other lending sources? If not for what reason did you choose 
FPC’s microcredit service over other sources, e.g. RCC or private moneylenders? 你曾经向农信
社或高利贷者借款吗？如果不曾，为何要选择扶贫社借款而不是其他渠道？ 
 
 
Open Q 2:  Please fill in your suggestions on current microcredit service: 
请把您对目前小额信贷项目的建议填写在下面： 
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 Semi-Structured Survey of Tuanshuitou Fuping Microcredit Fund  
湍氺头富平小额贷款基金项目半开放式调查问卷 
 
Part I- Basic Information of Household 第一部分-家庭基本信息 
 
Last Name 姓: ______ First Name 名:_________ Age 年龄:_______ Gender 性别:_________ 
 
How many lineal household members do you have？ (Only limited to parents and offspring)  
请列出您的直系家庭成员数 (只限计算父母子女): _______________________________ 
 
How many children do you have? 请列出您的子女数: __________________________ 
 
A. Housing 居住条件 
 
1. How many people/per room do you have? 您家每间房的居住人数是  
A.  Less than one   少于 1 人  B. 1 person   1 人 
C.  2 person     2 人   D. 3 and above 3 人以上 
 
B. Access to public services 公共设施使用 
 
3. How do you access the source of water? 您家使用的水源来自 
A.  Piped water 自来水 B. Well 井水 C. River or lake 河水或湖水 D. Other source 其他渠道 
 
2.  Do you use indoor toilet or outdoor toilet？ 
A.  Indoor  屋内厕所 B. Outdoor 公共厕所  
If it’s outdoor toilet, it is about _____ kilometer away from your home 
如果是屋外厕所，离您家大概_____公里 
 
3. Is electricity available for your household? 您家通电吗? 
A.  Yes, it is steady 是，电源稳定  B. Yes, but sometimes it suspends 有时停电 
C.  No 不通电 
 
4. What fuel is used for cooking at your home? 您家做饭用 
A.  Wood 柴禾    B. Coal gas or natural gas 煤气或天然气  
C.  Coal  煤     D. Others  其他燃料 ______________ 
 
C. Education 
 
3. The average education level of couples 夫妻平均教育水平 
Husband : ______ years  Wife : _____ years The average is (husband ＋ wife)/2=____years  
丈夫: ______    妻子: _____ 年  平均水平为 (丈夫＋ 妻子)/2=______年 
 
4. Percentage of children to go to school at your home 家中孩子入学比例 
B. 100% B. 75%  C. 66%  D. 50%  E. 33%   F. 25%   G. 0 
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 D.  Access to health srvices 卫生服务 
 
1. Is there pharmacy and clinic in the town?  No.否  Yes.是 It is____away from home 最近的
药店和诊所离家 
A. 1－3km 公里 B. 4－6km 公里 C. 7－9km 公里 D. 10km and above 10 公里以上 
 
4. Is it affordable for household members to go to see doctor normally? 通常家里人能支付得
起看病的费用吗？ 
A.  Yes  B. Sometimes can not afford  C. Not at all 
 
E.  Household labor and income 家庭劳动力和收入 
 
3. In your family, you and your husband/wife 在您家，您和您的丈夫/妻子 
A.  are making living by farming 都以种田为生 
B.  one is farmer and another is migrant worker or self-employed 一个种田另一个打工或做小
买卖 
C.  both are working as migrant workers or self-employed 两个都打工或做小买卖 
 
4. What is your household income by the end of 2008? 截止 2008 年底您的家庭年收入总额是 
A.  ￥4,001-￥6,000 B.￥6,001-￥8,000  C.￥8,000-￥10,000  D. Over ￥10,000 以上  
 
Part II Questions related to microfinance service 小额贷款相关服务信息 
 
A. Worth to client 贷款人获益 
4. How many times have you applied and received loans in the past 8 years？过去的 8 年里您
借过多少次款？ 
A.  1－5   B. 6－10   C. above 10  10 次以上 
 
5. The largest sum of loan you used to receive is up to 您的最大借款额为 
A.  ￥1001－￥3000  B. ￥3001－￥5000  D. ￥5000 above  ￥5000 以上  
 
6. The term of your loan maturity is 您的借款期限为 
A. half year 半年期   B. one year 一年期  C. I used to applied for both 两样都申请过 
 
B. Cost to client 贷款人成本 
4. How long does it take from your home to the fund office 从您家到贷款办公室要多长时
间？ 
A.  Less than half hour 半小时以内  B.  0.5-1hours 半小时－1 小时  
C.  1-2hours 1－2 小时     
 
5. Which way do you use to go to the fund office? 
A.  On feet 走路  B. By bicycle 骑自行车 C. By motorcycle 骑摩托车 
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 6. What evidence/documents/license is needed in order to get the loan? (Multi-choice) 申请贷
款需提交的材料包括 （多选） 
E. Application form, ID card，registered residential certificate 信息登记表, 身份证和户口本 
F. Evidence from hospital and school 医院或学校开具的证明 
G. Evidence for business or investment 创业或投资的证明 
H. Other materials 其他材料 _________________________________ 
 
C. Depth 深入度 
3. What do you use the loan for? 你申请贷款的目的是 
A. Small business for self-employment 自主创业  B. For children to go to school 孩子上学 
C.  Seeing doctor 看病       D. Other purpose 其他目的__________ 
 
4. Has the loan bring any change to your household? (Multi-choice) 贷款是否给您家带来任何
变化？(多选) 
A.  Household income sources were diversified 增加了家庭创收手段 
B.  Household anti-risk capacity was strengthen 家庭抗风险能力增强了 
C.  Household income increase 家庭收入增加了 
D.  There is little changes 基本没有变化 
 
D. Scope 服务品种 
5. Is the loan based on group-liability or collateral or just household credibility? (Multi-choice) 
贷款需要小组联保或者抵押担保吗？还是只是基于家庭信誉？(多选) 
A.  Group-liability 小组联保  B. Collateral 抵押担保  C. Household credibility 家庭信誉 
 
6. Is current loaning and paying procedure convenient？现有的借贷和还款程序是否方便？ 
B. Very convenient 非常方便 B. Need to be improved 有待提高 C. Not convenient 不方便 
 
7. Can current loan meet your quantity demand? 现有贷款额度是否能满足您的需要？ 
A. Yes 是  B. Not enough, I need 不够，我需要￥ _______________________ 
 
8. Are you satisfied with current service categories？您对目前小额贷款项目提供的服务种类
是否满意? 
A.  Satisfied   B. Not satisfied  
 
Open Q 1:  Have you ever used other lending sources? If not for what reason did you choose 
FPC’s microcredit service over other sources, e.g. RCC or private moneylenders? 你曾经向农信
社或高利贷者借款吗？如果不曾，为何要选择扶贫社借款而不是其他渠道？ 
 
 
Open Q 2:  Please fill in your suggestions on current microcredit service: 
请把您对目前小额信贷项目的建议填写在下面： 
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 APPENDIX 6 Interview List 
 
 Name Title of Interviewees Interview Time 
 
Ms. Chen Xiuling Yixian Bureau Accountant 2009-1-8 
Mr. Chu Yinghuan President of the NSMD 2008-12-25 
Ms. Jia Yanping Qiaotou town loan officer, 
Yixian Bureau, FPC 
2009-1-8 
Mr. Li Lunshun Chief Credit Supervisor in 
the field  
2008-12-9—2008-12-11 
Mr. Li Naiwei Chief Officer of TFMF 2008-12-5 and 2009-1-12 
Mr. Li Yiqing Dean of the Microcredit 
Office of CASS, who is in 
charge of the execution of 
FPC programs 
2008-12-24 and 
2009-1-13 
Mr. Mao Yushi Director-General of FDI 2007-10-18 
Ms. Sun Linlin Teacher in Tuanshuitou 
Civil Primary School 
2008-12-10 
Ms. Zhao Huayan Farmer in Tuanshuitou 
village, Tuanshuitou Town 
2008-12-10 
Mr. ZhaoYahe Dongbaima town loan 
officer, Yixian Bureau, 
FPC 
2009-1-8 
Mr. Zheng Kai Volunteer in library of 
Tuanshuitou Civil Primary 
School 
2008-12-10 
Mr. Zhou Xueren Yixian Bureau Chief, FPC 2009-1-7—2009-1-9 
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